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Abstract
An important approach for software dependability is the use of diversity to detect and/or
tolerate errors. We develop and evaluate an approach for automated program diversity
called Diverse Partial Memory Replication (DPMR), aimed at detecting memory safety
errors. DPMR is an automatic compiler transformation that replicates some subset of an
executable’s data memory and applies one or more diversity transformations to the replica.
DPMR can detect any kind of memory safety error in any part of a program’s data memory.
Moreover, DPMR is novel because it uses partial replication within a single address space,
replicating (and comparing) only a subset of a program’s memory. We propose and evaluate
two strategies for handling pointers stored in memory, a key challenge to DPMR. We also
perform a detailed study of the diversity mechanisms and state comparison policies in DPMR
(a first of its kind for such diversity approaches), which is valuable for exploiting the high
flexibility of DPMR. Finally, we explore the use of Data Structure Analysis to eliminate
nearly all restrictions on input programs that would otherwise be necessary.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, the dependability of computer systems has become a major concern among
research communities, businesses, and the public at large. There are many reasons for
the increased attention. First, computers are becoming ubiquitous in many areas of soci-
ety. Computers are relied on for control of aerospace systems, communication, storage of
business data, business sales, publications, and entertainment, among other things. The
increased usage has led not only to an increase in the number of failures but also to prolific
consequences. Computer failures are not just an inconvenience; they can result in loss of
life, money, time, and irreplaceable information. Second, particularly with the advent of the
Internet, dependability has had to face a new source of failures: malicious entities. Statis-
tics from the CERT Coordination Center [1], a center for Internet security expertise, show
that the number of reported vulnerabilities topped 5,500 every year from 2005 to 2007,1 a
tremendous increase from 171 in 1995. Although attacks have always been possible, the
Internet has brought about an omnipresent exposure to them. A third reason that depend-
ability has gained recent attention is that applications have become increasingly complex as
the use of computers expands. The increase in complexity has led to an increase in failures.
Finally, we have seen Moore’s law hold for decades, resulting in dramatic improvements in
hardware performance and capacity. With such improvements, computer systems can now
afford to devote resources to goals such as dependability, while still achieving their primary
functionality at acceptable performance levels.
Early dependability research focused on hardware faults with a good deal of success,
through a myriad of techniques that included formal methods, self-checking components,
and redundancy, such as in TMR systems. Software dependability, grown out of hardware
12007 is the last fully reported year.
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dependability, has enjoyed some success with techniques such as checkpoint-rollback, process
replication, exception handling, and various forms of reboot. However, there is still much
more to be done, as evidenced by notable software failures that have cost individual compa-
nies millions, and in some cases billions, of dollars [2]. A 2002 study by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated that software errors cost the U.S. nearly 60
billion dollars annually [3]. Another study estimates that 40% of unplanned application
downtime can be attributed to application failures [4].
Mismanaged memory in unsafe programming languages, such as C and C++, is a notorious
source of errors. Mismanaged memory can lead to buffer overflows, dangling pointers, and
uninitialized reads. Like other software bugs, those errors can result in crashes and incorrect
output. In addition, memory errors are notorious for opening vulnerabilities that attackers
can use to compromise a system. Many buffer overflows have made their way into production
systems and lend themselves to being exploited in a variety of ways [5]. In more recent times,
exploitable dangling pointers have shown up in applications such as the CVS revision control
system [6], the MIT Kerberos authentication daemon [7], the Opera web browser [8], and
the IIS web server [9].
Software memory errors have been difficult to detect, diagnose, and correct. Comprehen-
sive static analysis is intractable, and practical static analysis and testing have proven to
be insufficient for eliminating memory errors. For some systems, type-safe languages, like
Java, are appropriate. However, C and C++ are still widely popular and appropriate for
certain systems because of their performance, flexibility, and compatibility. In addition,
large amounts of legacy code are written in C and C++. Therefore, there remains a need
to develop techniques to detect memory errors in systems built with unsafe languages.
1.1 Proposed Approach
In this dissertation we contend that diversity and replicated runtime execution can be uti-
lized in an automated way to detect software memory errors in an effective and tunable
manner. In order to evaluate that thesis, we propose and develop an approach called Di-
verse Partial Memory Replication (DPMR) that utilizes diversity and replicated runtime
2
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Application
Memory
Replica
Memory
Figure 1.1: Example motivating the use of diversity
execution to detect software memory errors. More specifically, DPMR is an automatic com-
piler transformation that replicates a subset of an application’s data memory and applies a
diversity transformation to the replica. The goal of the diversity is to cause memory errors
to manifest differently in application memory and replica memory. Errors are detected by
comparing application memory and replica memory. In order for such a system to work,
the diversity transformation is designed such that the states of the application memory and
replica memory do not diverge under error-free execution.
To better understand the premise behind DPMR, consider the memory layouts in Fig-
ure 1.1. In the figure, the original memory subsystem contains objects A, B, and C, laid
out in that order. The replica memory subsystem, under a diverse environment, has the
same objects, but they are laid out in the order of A followed by C followed by B. If the
original program contained a buffer overflow out of object A, it would corrupt object B in
the original memory subsystem and object C in the replica memory subsystem. If we later
compared the value of object B (or object C) in the original memory to that of object B
(or object C) in the replica memory, we would detect the occurrence of a memory error.
Unlike traditional replication approaches, DPMR utilizes a partial replication approach
that limits replication to an application’s memory subsystem. By doing so, DPMR eliminates
replication of non-memory computations. The results of those computations are stored in
both the original memory and the replica. To make the approach efficient and correct,
DPMR combines both the original behavior and the replica in a single process. That is
a key difference from previous systems, which generally use separate OS processes for the
original and the replica behavior.
Another important aspect of DPMR is tunability, and that tunability is one focus of this
dissertation. In particular, we analyze how design decisions, diversity transformations, and
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state comparison policies affect the performance and dependability attributes of DPMR.
The study is important because different applications may perform better under different
designs, diversity transformations, and state comparison policies. Furthermore, different
deployment environments may have different performance and dependability requirements.
For example, it may be desirable to spend more resources on dependability when a new
version of an application is deployed than when an older, trusted version is deployed. In
addition, different industries have different requirements for their computer systems. A web
server handling financial transactions likely has stronger dependability requirements than a
web server providing sports news.
1.2 Diverse Partial Replication
DPMR falls under a broader category of strategies that we term Diverse Partial Replication
(DPR) strategies. As with DPMR, DPR replicates the portion of a system that is relevant
to the target fault model and diversifies the replica. The intended purpose of the diversity
is to cause errors to manifest differently in the original program behavior and in the replica
behavior, while not causing differences between the states of the original program and the
partial replica, under error-free execution.
Three important qualities of DPR make it an attractive dependability strategy in general.
First, DPR can detect deterministically activated faults that make it into production sys-
tems. A deterministically activated fault is a fault F in a program P , defined such that if
F can manifest as an error when input set I is applied to P , then F will always manifest
as an error when I is applied to P . While deterministically activated faults may be eas-
ier to fix because they can be predictably repeated in a debugging environment, they have
proven to be extremely difficult to detect once they have made it into production systems.
Traditional dependability approaches such as process replication, checkpoint-rollback, and
reboot cannot handle deterministically activated faults because they rely on multiple exe-
cutions of the same piece of code in the same environment. Unfortunately, deterministically
activated faults manifest the same way in each of those executions, rendering the techniques
ineffective.
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Second, DPR is tunable, making it adaptable for the different requirements of different
deployment scenarios. In Section 1.1, we discussed using interoperable diversity transfor-
mations and interoperable state comparison policies as one method of tunability. Another
strategy for tunability is to design partial replicas based on component priorities. Compo-
nents of a system that are affected by the fault model of concern can be prioritized by factors
such as susceptibility to the fault model, cost to deploy DPR, and the detection capability
afforded by DPR. Then, given finite resources, DPR can be optimized so that it replicates
high-priority components before lower-priority components.
The third attractive property of DPR is that it is a strategy that can be applied to arbitrary
fault models. In this dissertation, we focus on memory errors; however, DPR could be used
to detect errors such as race conditions and violations of library assumptions. To illustrate
the flexibility of DPR, we will briefly examine a race condition example.
Consider a banking system in which incoming requests, such as a deposit, withdraw, or
balance check, are placed in a queue that is serviced by several worker threads. The system
specification requires that requests made to the same account be processed in the order in
which they arrive. It is the bank’s policy to charge overdrawn accounts a $15 penalty. Let’s
say an account owner has a balance of $100. She makes a request X to deposit a $200 check
into her account, followed by a request Y to withdraw $250 in cash from her account. In a
faulty implementation, the system may have a race condition that allows requests made to
the same account to be processed out of order. Figure 1.2(a) demonstrates how such a fault
could manifest as an error. To detect such an error, DPR could be used to replicate the
threaded execution as well as the data upon which it operates. Then, a diversified scheduler
could be used to produce the replica execution shown in Figure 1.2(b). The error could be
detected by comparing the account balances at the ends of the original faulty execution and
the diverse replica execution.
1.3 Scope of DPMR
We intend for DPMR to be used for both production systems and debugging environments.
Such a scope is viable due to the tunability of DPMR. DPMR’s dependability focus is the
5
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Y : withdraw($250)
overdrawnCheck()
applyPenalty($15)
X: deposit($200)
worker 2
(a) Original faulty execution
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overdrawnCheck()
Y : withdraw($250)
worker 2worker 1
X: deposit($200)
(b) Diverse replica execution
Figure 1.2: DPR applied to a race condition
detection of spatial and temporal software memory errors in all segments of application
memory, including the stack, the heap, and global variables. However, it is important to
recognize that DPMR also detects hardware memory errors. The ability to handle hard-
ware memory errors is important because it allows us to deploy a single strategy to handle
hardware and software memory errors, which can lead to easier-to-manage systems, and cost
reductions.
Below we define the classes of software memory errors that DPMR detects.
• out-of-bounds access : An out-of-bounds access occurs when a read, write, or free in-
tended for an allocated memory buffer O occurs outside the valid bounds for such an
operation. Valid reads and writes to O are bounded by the memory occupied by O.
Valid frees are constrained to pointers that point to the start of O. Out-of-bounds
writes are typically called buffer overflows . Out-of-bounds frees are a subset of what
is sometimes referred to in the literature as invalid frees .
The intended target of an out-of-bounds read or write can live in global variables, stack
memory, or heap memory, while the target of an out-of-bounds free must reside on the
heap. An out-of-bounds write, i.e., a buffer overflow, can be damaging because it can
corrupt memory that it is not intended to modify. An out-of-bounds read is dangerous
because it can read arbitrary data values. Out-of-bounds frees can result in immediate
crashes, memory corruption, and premature deallocation of memory.
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• dangling pointer use: Dangling pointers are pointers to memory buffers that are no
longer valid because they have been deallocated. Dangling pointers are restricted to
the stack and the heap, since global variables are never deallocated. Usage of dangling
pointers becomes dangerous if the referenced memory has been reallocated to hold
other data. Dangling pointer writes, reads, and frees have similar consequences to
out-of-bounds writes, reads, and frees. In the literature, a dangling pointer free is
sometimes referred to as a double free.
• wild pointer use: A wild pointer is a pointer that is not derived from a valid allocation
source. Valid allocation sources include malloc, alloca, and global variables. Unini-
tialized pointers are a common source of wild pointers. Wild pointers can point to an
arbitrary memory address. The use of a wild pointer can result in the same negative
consequences as an out-of-bounds access or a dangling pointer use.
• uninitialized read : An uninitialized read occurs when the value of an object is read
from memory before that object has ever been given an initial value. Uninitialized
reads can occur to global variables, stack memory, and heap memory. Uninitialized
reads are dangerous because the read value is arbitrary.
There is one class of software memory errors that is not detectable by DPMR. It consists of
memory leaks. Memory leaks occur when memory objects are no longer used by a program
but are not deallocated. Memory leaks can degrade performance. However, they do not
alter program behavior until the memory address space has been exhausted, at which point
the program is either informed or aborted. In that sense, memory leaks are self-detectable.
1.4 Terminology
In this section, we define some general terminology that will be used throughout this disser-
tation.2
2The definitions for failure, fault , and error are based on those in [10].
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• failure: A failure occurs when realized system behavior deviates from correct behavior.
Correct behavior is defined on a system-by-system basis. A system that produces
incorrect output is considered to have failed. A system that crashes may or may not
be considered a failure, depending on the system specification.
• error : An error is a deviation in system state that could lead to a failure. For example,
the execution of a buffer overflow, i.e., a memory write beyond the bounds of the
intended memory object, constitutes an error.
• fault : A fault is the potential cause of an error. In a C program, a malloc call
instruction that does not always allocate a buffer large enough to hold the data it is
intended to hold is a fault.
• process replication: Process replication is a form of replicated execution. Process
replication involves simultaneous execution of two or more copies of a process P , with
the same input, whose goal is to produce the results of one non-faulty copy of P .
The copies of P execute from copies of code that are identical except in auxiliary
functionality required for simultaneous execution. The salient properties of process
replication are (1) that replicas produce the same output given the same input, in the
absence of environment faults, and (2) that replicas are full copies of P .
• replica: In this dissertation, unless qualified more specifically, the term replica refers to
a duplicate of a software component. That component may comprise an entire system
or one piece of a system. We often use the term to refer to a block of memory whose
purpose is to hold the same data as an application block of memory.
1.5 Related Work
We now discuss work related to this dissertation. In particular, we consider two areas of
research: software memory safety and software diversity.
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1.5.1 Software Memory Safety
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, mismanaged memory is a serious threat to
software dependability. Therefore, software memory safety has garnered much attention
among researchers. Below, we discuss five categories of software memory safety research.
We focus our discussion on techniques that address both spatial and temporal memory errors.
Runtime Checking Most memory safety approaches maintain metadata and use it to
detect memory errors by performing checks at runtime. Two of the most well-known of
those approaches are Valgrind’s Memcheck [11] and Purify [12]. Both tools can detect
the same types of memory errors as DPMR, as well as memory leaks. Memcheck uses
dynamic binary instrumentation to track which bits in memory have valid data values
and which bytes have been allocated. Purify instruments compiled object code to
maintain a two-bit state for each byte in memory. The state indicates whether a byte
is allocated and, if so, whether the byte is initialized. Both tools check metadata at
memory accesses to determine if an access is valid. Memcheck and Purify are known
as debugging tools because of the large overheads that they can incur. In addition,
neither tool is able to detect dangling pointers to reallocated memory or out-of-bounds
pointers to valid memory, both of which are error classes that DPMR can detect. To
help minimize the dangling pointer shortcoming, Purify delays the reallocation of freed
buffers. Two more advantages that DPMR has over Memcheck and Purify are that
DPMR can detect hardware memory errors, and DPMR’s detection capabilities are
tunable.
Another popular method for performing runtime memory checks uses per-pointer meta-
data. One of the earliest approaches that uses per-pointer metadata is Safe-C [13]. The
metadata for a pointer p include the bounds of the object to which p points, as well
as a capability that is tracked in a Global Capability Store (GCS). When p’s object is
deallocated, p’s capability is removed from the GCS, letting us know that p is tempo-
rally invalid. Safe-C uses fat pointers to track metadata. Fat pointers replace pointers
with a struct that contains the original pointer as well as the metadata. One of the
major drawbacks of Safe-C is that fat pointers are not compatible with libraries that
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have not been processed by Safe-C. In addition, the per-pointer metadata approach is
not capable of detecting uninitialized reads.
Patil and Fischer [14] and Xu et al. [15] improve on Safe-C by eliminating the use
of fat pointers. Instead, they maintain metadata separately from pointers. However,
neither approach allows arbitrary pointer-to-pointer casts, a restriction that DPMR
overcomes with the design described in Chapter 4. Patil and Fischer and Xu et al.
also disallow int-to-pointer casts,3 which DPMR overcomes as described in Chapter 5.
Another major difference between DPMR and the approaches that track per-pointer
metadata is that DPMR is suited for detecting hardware memory errors, while the
per-pointer metadata approaches are not.
The final runtime-checking approach that we examine is BGI [16]. BGI is slightly
different from the approaches discussed above and does not detect errors at the same
granularity as those approaches. BGI uses access control lists to enforce fault isolation
boundaries between the kernel and kernel extensions. BGI is not intended to enforce
internal memory properties such as the absence of array bounds violations and dangling
pointer errors. In addition, it does not have any facilities for detecting uninitialized
reads. However, at very low overheads it may be an appropriate technique to deploy
when more comprehensive detection is not required.
Static Analysis and Runtime Checking In addition to the runtime checking methods
discussed above, there is a class of methods that combines static analysis with run-
time checking. One such tool is CCured [17]. Using static analysis, CCured classi-
fies pointers as safe pointers, sequence pointers, or wild pointers. At runtime, safe
pointer accesses are null-checked. Sequence pointer accesses are bounds-checked and
null-checked. Wild pointer accesses are bounds-checked, null-checked, and checked for
type consistency. In order to handle dangling pointer errors, CCured uses conservative
garbage collection. Unfortunately, garbage collection avoids dangling pointer errors
instead of detecting them. In addition, garbage collection can impose severe perfor-
mance penalties and can unnecessarily increase memory usage. Another drawback to
3In the term int-to-pointer, int refers to an integer.
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CCured is that it deploys fat pointers for sequence pointers and wild pointers. As
mentioned earlier, fat pointers are not generally compatible with library code. Finally,
CCured does not detect uninitialized reads in general.
SAFECode [18] is a second approach that combines static analysis and runtime check-
ing. The goal of SAFECode is to enforce memory safety at a level that guarantees the
following compiler analysis results: a call graph, a points-to graph, and type informa-
tion, such that the points-to graph and type information result from a flow-insensitive,
field-sensitive, and unification-based pointer analysis. However, SAFECode has been
extended by other work from the SAFECode authors to detect array out-of-bounds
errors [19] and dangling pointer errors [20].
In [19], Dhurjati and Adve improve upon the work of Jones and Kelly [21] and Ruwase
and Lam [22] for detecting array out-of-bounds errors. The work by Jones and Kelly
uses a splay tree to track object bounds, and runtime checks are used to detect out-
of-bounds memory accesses. Ruwase and Lam extend the work of Jones and Kelly to
handle a key shortcoming of it, namely, that it does not allow invalid pointers, even
if the pointers are not accessed. The major contribution of Dhurjati and Adve is the
use of provably distinct memory pools to reduce the size of the Jones and Kelly splay
trees. In addition, they eliminate many load and store checks required by Ruwase and
Lam by forcing out-of-bounds pointers to point to protected memory. Thus, accesses
of the out-of-bounds pointers will result in hardware traps.
In [20], Dhurjati and Adve propose an approach for detecting dangling pointer errors in
which each heap object is mapped to a new virtual page. When a heap object is freed,
the corresponding virtual page is protected from future reads and writes. In order to
make that approach efficient, when a heap object is freed, the underlying physical page
is unmapped, even though the underlying virtual page is not. There are two major
drawbacks to the approach. First, significant overhead is moved to memory allocation
and deallocation points. Therefore, the approach may not be suitable for applications
that perform many allocations and deallocations. Second, the approach utilizes a
memory pool strategy that may exhaust virtual memory if pools are long-lived. The
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authors discuss several techniques to handle long-lived pools; however, such techniques
may reduce detection capabilities or require garbage collection or programmer support.
Randomized Memory Layouts A third approach to spatial and temporal memory safety
is the use of randomized memory layouts. DieHard [23] is one of the first approaches to
utilize a randomized memory layout for memory safety. DieHard tries to emulate the
semantics of an infinite heap by over-allocating the heap and randomizing the layout of
heap objects. In an infinite heap, buffer overflows are benign, because there is infinite
space between heap objects. DieHard simulates that property, with a high probability,
by placing empty space between heap objects. Dangling pointer errors are also benign
in an infinite heap because heap objects never need to be freed. DieHard emulates
that behavior by randomizing the selection of free objects to be allocated, making it
unlikely that a recently freed object will be reallocated. DieHard detects uninitialized
reads by using process replication and by randomizing the value of initial heap data.
In order to make the allocation of heap objects efficient, DieHard partitions the heap
into pools of fixed-size objects.
One drawback to DieHard is that it does not protect the stack or global variables.
Consequently, it is incapable of handling arbitrary wild pointers. Another major dif-
ference between DPMR and DieHard is that DieHard’s approach is to avoid memory
errors, while DPMR’s approach is to detect them. Both avoidance and detection have
their advantages and disadvantages, and the deployment scenario will dictate which
is more appropriate. Although DieHard and DPMR are different approaches to the
same problem, each one can borrow aspects from the other. For example, DPMR
could utilize DieHard’s heap allocator to achieve diversity. On the other hand, when
in replication mode, DieHard could utilize DPMR’s partial replication strategy.
Archipelago [24] extends DieHard with the aim of reducing DieHard’s physical memory
consumption. As described above, DieHard leaves large portions of unallocated virtual
memory between allocated objects. Unfortunately, the unallocated virtual memory
consumes physical memory. They key to Archipelago is that if unallocated memory
between objects occupies an entire page of virtual memory, that virtual page does not
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have to be committed to physical memory. Therefore, Archipelago places each heap
object on its own virtual memory page and leaves one or more pages of unallocated
memory between objects. Those pages of unallocated memory are not committed to
physical memory. In addition, Archipelago uses a coloring algorithm that prevents the
degradation of cache performance. The coloring algorithm ensures that even though
each object occupies an entire page of memory, different objects fall on different cache
lines.
Another approach that extends DieHard is DieHarder [25]. DieHarder’s goal is to
thwart heap-based attacks. One technique DieHarder uses to do so is sparse allocation
of objects throughout the heap. The sparse allocation technique leaves guard pages be-
tween objects, which when accessed crash the program. Another technique DieHarder
deploys is destruction of freed object data.
The last approach that we examine that uses randomized memory layouts is Heap
Server [26]. Heap Server was developed concurrently with DieHard and uses similar
concepts. It randomizes the layout of the heap by placing random padding between
heap objects and by randomizing the selection of the chunks of deallocated memory
that will be allocated for new objects. The main difference between Heap Server and
DieHard is that Heap Server stores heap metadata in a separate process. Because it
does so, the metadata are protected from attacks.
Error Correction A fourth approach to memory safety is correction of memory errors.
The most prominent project in that category is Exterminator [27]. Exterminator
combines the DieHard allocator with the use of fence posts and canary values . Fence
posts are special data values that are placed between objects to detect buffer overflows,
while canaries are special data values that are placed in unallocated memory to detect
dangling pointer writes. When Exterminator detects an error, it dumps a heap image.
Multiple heap images are statistically analyzed to diagnose the source of a heap error.
After the source of an error has been identified, a patch can be automatically generated
to address errors. It is possible to patch a buffer overflow by increasing the amount of
space that is allocated for the buffer. It is possible to patch dangling pointer errors by
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delaying deallocation of the objects pointed to by the dangling pointers. It is important
to note that Exterminator is not a panacea. It attempts to correct a symptom; however,
the underlying fault may manifest in other ways not handled by a patch. We also note
that Exterminator does not address uninitialized reads, global variables, and stack
variables.
A second approach to memory error correction is Rx [28]. Rx uses a checkpoint-rollback
scheme. However, after detecting an error and rolling a program back to a checkpoint,
Rx executes the program in a diverse environment that is designed to avoid the error
in the second execution. For example, if a buffer overflow is detected, the overflowed
buffer can be padded. In [28], Qin et al. focus on the architecture and do not present
new methods for detection of memory safety violations. Therefore, DPMR and Rx
could aid each other. DPMR could be used to detect memory errors, and Rx could be
used to recover from the detected errors.
Diverse Replication The final category of memory safety approaches is diverse replication.
This category includes DPMR and Samurai [29]. In Samurai, a programmer identifies
certain memory on the heap as critical. Critical memory is protected through a com-
bination of intra-process replication and the diversity afforded by DieHard. Samurai
can detect errors with two replicas and can recover with three replicas.
There are two major differences between Samurai and DPMR. First, the intra-process
replication that is used by DPMR is automatically chosen, while the intra-process
replication that is used by Samurai is programmer-specified. Identification of the
critical memory that is the basis for Samurai’s replication is not trivial. Another
nontrivial task is the identification of critical stores. Although it is safe to identify
a store as critical when it is not, doing so adds unnecessary branches to the code to
check if the memory is actually critical memory. The second major difference between
Samurai and DPMR is that Samurai does not consider uninitialized reads, double
frees, global variables, and stack variables, while DPMR does handle all of those error
classes.
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1.5.2 Software Diversity
The other category of work that is closely related to DPMR is software diversity. Software
diversity is a much-touted mechanism for dealing with deterministically activated faults
and malicious faults. Because of growing concerns over security, many papers have been
published on software diversity, including several in the last 15 years. The software diversity
research most relevant to the work presented in this dissertation falls into two categories:
diverse redundant software and diverse software execution.
Diverse Redundant Software Diverse redundant software is a group of techniques for
constructing dependable software from diverse redundant components. The most
prevalent diverse redundant software approach is N-version software (NVS) [30]. NVS
is a system for fault tolerance in which multiple diverse replicas are simultaneously
executed. The states of the replicas are periodically compared to detect faulty repli-
cas, which can often be corrected upon detection. More recent takes on NVS, such
as N-variant systems [31], Orchestra [32], and proactive obfuscation [33], aim to ad-
vance the state of the art in NVS to tolerate security attacks. An important problem
in NVS is that of determining which replicas are correct and which are not. Many
decision algorithms have been developed to address that problem, including majority
voting [34,35], consensus voting [35,36], maximum likelihood voting [37], and t/(n−1)-
variant programming [38]. DieHard’s active replication scheme, Exterminator’s active
replication scheme, Samurai, and DPMR are all examples of NVS systems.
Two other diverse redundant software techniques are recovery blocks [39–41] and N
self-checking programming (NSCP) [42]. While NVS is an actively redundant strategy,
recovery blocks are a cold spare strategy, and NSCP is a hot spare strategy. Recovery
blocks work as follows. An application takes a checkpoint C. It then executes a
variant X1 of a component X, after which an acceptance test is applied to determine
whether X1 ran correctly. If it did not run correctly, the application rolls back to
C and executes a different variant of X. That process is applied recursively until a
variant of X passes an acceptance test or all variants have failed. Under NSCP, an
application simultaneously executes several variants of a software component. One of
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the variants is named as the primary. If the primary fails, then one of the active spares
takes over. It is different from NVS, because the different variants of a component are
not compared with each other to detect errors.
In order for diverse redundant software systems to accomplish their goals, they re-
quire sources of replica diversity. One of the first approaches for generating replica
diversity was N-version programming (NVP) [30,34]. NVP is an approach in which in-
dependent programming teams develop N different versions of a software component.
However, its ability to produce useful diversity, which is necessary for diverse redun-
dant software, has been brought into question [43–46]. Another method for achieving
component diversity is to use diversity that occurs naturally when multiple vendors
develop competing products. That is the approach taken by BASE [47]. The useful-
ness of such an approach is legitimized by studies of fault diversity in systems such as
SQL database servers [48] and operating systems [49]. A third way to obtain replica
diversity is through data diversity. That is the approach taken by DieHard’s active
replication scheme, Exterminator’s active replication scheme, Samurai, and DPMR. It
is also utilized by the N-variant systems work [50].
Diverse Software Execution Diverse software execution encompasses a group of tech-
niques in which software is executed in diverse execution environments. Here we discuss
four categories of diverse software execution.
One category of diverse software execution approaches utilizes diversity for recovery.
We already discussed one example of such approaches, Rx. Two more examples are
the portable checkpointing approaches Porch [51] and PREACHES [52]. Portable
checkpoints allow a process that fails in one environment to recover in a heteroge-
neous environment. A second category of diverse software execution approaches con-
sists of approaches that utilize randomized memory layouts. In addition to DieHard
and Exterminator, there are several approaches that randomize the layout of address
spaces [53–57]. The goal of the address space randomization techniques is to foil at-
tacks that require address space knowledge. The third category of diverse software
execution approaches is that of randomized instruction sets [58, 59]. Randomized in-
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struction sets attempt to prevent code-injection attacks by rendering the injected code
useless. The final category of diverse software execution approaches involves operating
system-enabled diverse execution. For example, various aspects of system calls can be
randomized [53,54]. As with many of the other diverse software execution techniques,
the goal is to thwart attacks.
1.6 Contributions
At the highest level, the contribution of this dissertation is an automated and tunable
approach to detecting software memory errors called Diverse Partial Memory Replication
(DPMR). More specifically, the contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
• We introduce DPMR, an automated and tunable methodology for detecting software
memory errors. It detects both spatial and temporal memory errors in all forms of
memory, including global variables, the stack, and the heap. DPMR can also detect
memory hardware faults, although that is not the focus of this dissertation.
• We introduce the concept of partial replication, which improves replication overhead
by automatically replicating only the software components that are relevant to the
targeted fault model, and places a replica in the same process as the corresponding
original component.4 There are many advantages to intra-process replication, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.1. Our primary contributions regarding partial replication have
been to show how to do it and to evaluate key design choices. Comparison with full
replication is left to future work.
• A key challenge when performing intra-process memory replication is handling pointers
stored in memory. In particular, if pointers stored to replica memory are identical
to those stored in application memory, we lose the ability to traverse replica data
structures. If pointers stored to replica memory permit the traversal of replica data
structures, we lose the ability to compare pointers stored in memory. We propose
4The automatically chosen, intra-process replication presented here is similar in concept to the
programmer-specified replication used in Samurai [29].
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two strategies for handling pointers stored in memory. One strategy, Shadow Data
Structures, permits comparison of pointers stored in memory. The other strategy,
Mirrored Data Structures, reduces overhead and memory consumption in general but
loses the ability to compare pointers stored in memory.
• We develop the algorithms, compiler transformations, and design details needed to
implement DPMR for the C programming language.
• We provide a first-of-its-kind study of diversity mechanisms and state comparison
policies for diverse redundant software that addresses memory errors. This study is
instrumental in fulfilling DPMR’s goal of tunability, as well as fulfilling that goal for
other systems that use diverse redundant software for software memory errors.
• We design a framework for reasoning about DPMR in the presence of an incomplete
program and unrecognized pointer behavior.
• We develop algorithms to extend the scope of DPMR to most of C. Those algorithms
include solutions to the load comparison problem, the int-to-pointer cast problem, and
the problem of storing pointers that masquerade as integers.
1.7 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the design and
development of DPMR. In particular, it proposes an approach for managing pointers stored
in memory, which is a key challenge for DPMR. It also includes several proposed diversity
transformations and state comparison policies that are later evaluated in Chapter 3. While
Chapter 2 describes the salient features of DPMR, Chapter 3 addresses details relevant to
the construction of a tool based on DPMR. It also presents an experimental evaluation of
that tool. Chapter 4 considers an alternative DPMR design whose goal is to reduce the
overheads reported in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 examines an approach that eliminates many of
the limitations and restrictions imposed by initial DPMR designs. The approach utilizes a
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compiler analysis called Data Structure Analysis . Chapter 6 discusses future DPMR research
that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Diverse Partial Memory Replication
In this chapter, we discuss the design of DPMR, first introduced in [60]. We start by defining
partial replication in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 introduces and proposes a solution to a key
challenge to DPMR, i.e., the handling of pointers stored in memory. Section 2.3 presents
a method for mapping application memory to replica memory across function boundaries.
Sections 2.4 devises the compiler transformations used to instrument an application with
DPMR. Section 2.5 examines the conditions under which DPMR will detect an error. Sec-
tions 2.6 and 2.7 describe interoperable comparison transformations and state comparison
policies, which are later evaluated in Chapter 3. Section 2.8 discusses a strategy to handle
external code. Finally, Section 2.9 identifies the limitations of the approach described in
this chapter. Many of those limitations are mitigated with the contributions of Chapters 4
and 5.
Throughout this dissertation, we make several assumptions about input programs in order
to describe various data type rules and code transformations. The assumptions described
here are typical of the kinds of assumptions that are made by the intermediate representations
that are used by compilers. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, e.g., when discussing details
pertaining to C, the assumptions described here apply. When defining types, if an element of
a derived type is null, then that element drops out of the derived type. If all of the elements
of a derived type are null, then the derived type is null.
We assume that the type system of input programs contains primitive integer and floating
point types of predefined sizes. The type system also includes a void type and five derived
types: pointers, structures, unions, arrays, and functions. All pointer types have the same
predefined size. Array types, designated by square brackets, do not imply a pointer as they
do in C. Therefore, the type struct{int32; int32; int32;} is equivalent to int32[3].
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In addition to the assumptions we make on the type system, we assume an architecture
in which virtual registers and memory are distinct. Virtual registers can never be accessed
through load and store operations, while programs can only interact with memory through
loads and stores. We assume that programs can allocate three types of memory: heap
memory (via malloc calls), stack memory (via alloca calls), and global variable memory
(via global declarations). In doing so, we assume that all global variables are pointers to
memory. Our final assumption is that virtual registers can hold only scalars, i.e, they can
hold integers, floating point values, and pointers. As a result, each load operation loads one
scalar value. Each store operation stores one scalar value. Functions return up to one scalar
value, and function parameters are scalars.
2.1 Partial Replication
A key aspect of the DPMR design is partial replication. At its heart, partial replication
implies that a portion of a system and/or its components are replicated. Such replication
is in contrast to traditional process replication techniques. Three factors motivate a partial
replication design. First, if our target fault model affects only a portion of a system, then
it is unnecessary to replicate the entire system. Second, for replication techniques that
utilize state comparison, if the state of a component cannot be reasoned about, then it is
unnecessary to replicate that component. Third, in an effort to support tunability, it may
be desirable to disable replication of some components, creating even more of a trade-off
between performance and dependability.
The first factor mentioned above is the premise for the partial replicas discussed through-
out the majority of this dissertation. In DPMR, only the memory subsystem is replicated,
because it is the portion of an application that is directly affected by memory errors. The
second factor, i.e., the one pertaining to components whose state cannot be reasoned about,
is utilized in Chapter 5 to refine the partial replication used by DPMR. The third moti-
vating factor, i.e., the ability to restrict replication to tune the performance-dependability
trade-off, is only explored in this thesis through various state comparison policies that limit
state comparisons. However, we feel that further development of such partial replicas could
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Figure 2.1: Implicit diversity
be a substantial contribution of future research efforts.
In DPMR, partial replication is built on the concept of intra-process replication. Repli-
cated behavior is placed in the same process as original program behavior. The intra-process
partial replication scheme used in DPMR has many advantages over a full-process replica-
tion scheme. First, intra-process replication eliminates many sources of overhead that would
exist in a full replication scheme. It eliminates overhead from the replication of non-memory-
related instructions. It eliminates overhead spent on costly state transfers between replicas,
which would be necessary to distribute input, the results of unreplicated computation, and
data for state comparisons. Finally, it eliminates the time spent synchronizing at application-
environment interactions.
The second major benefit of intra-process replication over full-process replication is that
intra-process replication eliminates OS and library support that would otherwise be required
to replicate system interactions. The third advantage is that intra-process replication leads
to implicit diversity. Because original application-allocated memory and replicated memory
occupy the same virtual address space, it is unlikely that the memory immediately following
(or preceding) an application object X will be occupied by an object paired with the object
immediately following (or preceding) X’s replica object, unless explicitly manufactured. For
example, if an application object X is allocated, followed in sequence by the allocations of
X’s replica (Xr), another application object Y , and Y ’s replica (Yr), those objects will often
be laid out as shown in Figure 2.1. In the figure, the object following X is Xr, and the
object following Xr is Y . If there is a buffer overflow out of X, once the store operation that
creates the overflow has been replicated, two unpaired objects, Xr and Y , will be corrupted.
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Figure 2.2: Replication using non-comparable pointers
2.2 Shadow Data Structures
The main mechanism to achieve DPMR’s intra-process partial replication is a compiler
transformation that replicates memory allocation, deallocation, load, and store instructions.
Doing so necessitates a runtime method for tracking application object-replica object pairs.
In DPMR, such tracking is done by also replicating pointer operations. However, a program
may store pointers to memory. Therefore, when a program stores a pointer to memory, we
also need to store a replica pointer to memory. One method for doing so is to store the
replica pointer to replica memory, yielding memory layouts such as that in Figure 2.2. In
the figure, object X contains a pointer to Y ; therefore, Xr contains a pointer to Yr.
Unfortunately, the pointer value stored in X is not comparable to the pointer value stored
in Xr. In order to improve detection capabilities, DPMR discards that scheme for a scheme
in which pointers are comparable. In other words, the same pointer values that are stored
in application objects are also stored in replica objects, as shown in Figure 2.3. However,
that leaves us without a mapping from application object pointers to replica object pointers
for pointers stored in memory. In Figure 2.3, if the pointer stored in object X, pointing to
Y , is traversed, we are left without a method to get a pointer to Yr.
One solution to that problem, and the solution DPMR utilizes, is to keep a shadow data
structure that holds replica pointers. For each application object-replica object pair, a third
shadow object is maintained, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. For each pointer that is stored to
an application object, we store a replica pointer to that object’s shadow object. Consider
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Figure 2.4: Replication using shadow data structures
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Table 2.1: Shadow type definition
Description Original Type t Shadow Type st(t)
array τ [] st(τ)[]
struct struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; } struct{st(τ0); . . . ; st(τn); }
union union{τ0; . . . ; τn; } union{st(τ0); . . . ; st(τn); }
pointer
τ∗ : st(τ) 6= ∅ struct{τ∗; st(τ)∗; }
τ∗ : st(τ) = ∅ struct{τ∗; void∗}
primitive, function,
and void types
τ ∅
Figure 2.4. When an application stores a pointer to Y in object X (the red pointer in the
figure), DPMR performs three additional store operations.
1. A pointer identical to that stored in X is stored to Xr. The store is represented by the
green pointer from Xr to Y . The pointer values stored to X and Xr will be identical
under error-free execution.
2. A pointer is also stored to Xs that points to Yr, represented by the blue pointer. That
pointer is necessary so that if the pointer to Y stored in X is extracted, we will be able
to extract a pointer to Y ’s replica.
3. The final additional store operation stores a pointer to Y ’s shadow object in X’s
shadow object, represented by the brown pointer in the figure. The pointer to Ys is
needed so that if the pointer to Y is extracted from X, we will have a handle to Y ’s
shadow object.
Therefore, for every pointer to object Q stored to an application object O, we store two
pointers in O’s shadow object: a replica object pointer (ROP) pointing to Q’s replica and a
next shadow object pointer (NSOP) pointing to Q’s shadow object. We call the replication
design using shadow objects Shadow Data Structures (SDS).
SDSs are typed using shadow types (st()), as defined in Table 2.1. The definition can be
divided into three categories: aggregate and union types, pointer types, and all other types.
The shadow type for an aggregate or union type is constructed by applying the aggregate or
union type, respectively, to the shadow types of its elements. The shadow type of a pointer
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Table 2.2: Examples of shadow types
Original Type Shadow Type
int8[]*; struct int8ArrayPtrSdwTy{
int8[]* rop;
void* nsop;
};
int8[]**; struct int8ArrayPtrPtrSdwTy{
int8[]** rop;
struct int8ArrayPtrSdwTy* nsop;
};
struct LinkedList{ struct LinkedListSdwTy{
int32 data; struct{
struct LinkedList* nxt; struct LinkedList* rop;
}; struct LinkedListSdwTy* nsop;
} nxtSdwObj;
};
struct dir; struct dirSdwTy;
struct file{ struct fileSdwTy{
int8[]* name; struct int8ArrayPtrSdwTy nameSdwObj;
int32 size; struct{
struct dir* parent; struct dir* rop;
}; struct dirSdwTy* nsop;
} parentSdwObj;
};
p is a structure containing a pointer for p’s ROP and a pointer for p’s NSOP. The ROP has
the same type as p. The NSOP has a pointer type composed of the shadow type of the object
that p points to, unless that shadow type is null. In the case for which the shadow type of
the object that p points to is null, the NSOP is given a void pointer. The void pointer type
is a placeholder in case p is cast to a type α∗ such that the shadow type of α is not null.
Finally, the shadow type for primitive types and function types is null because we do not
need to carry any extra metadata for those types.
Table 2.2 contains examples of several shadow types. Consider the type int8[]*, a pointer
to an array of 8-bit integers. (As stated at the beginning of this chapter, square brackets in
a type do not imply a pointer.) Since the shadow type of an integer is null, then the shadow
type of an array of integers is null. Therefore, when constructing the shadow type of int8[]*,
we get a structure composed of a replica pointer of the same type and a void pointer, to
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replace the pointer to a null shadow type. To compute the shadow type for int8[]**, we
build on the shadow type for int8[]*. Using the rule for pointers, the shadow type for
int8[]** is a structure composed of a replica pointer and a pointer to the shadow type of
int8[]*, as shown in Table 2.2.
We now examine the shadow type for a linked list. The linked list is defined using a
structure; therefore, its shadow type is a structure composed of the shadow types of its
elements. The first element is an integer. The integer’s shadow type is null, since there is
no shadow data to keep for types that do not contain pointers. The second element of the
linked list structure is the recursive pointer nxt. Since nxt is a pointer, its shadow type is
a structure containing an ROP and an NSOP. The ROP has the same type as nxt, i.e., a
pointer to a linked list structure. The NSOP is a pointer to the shadow type of a linked list,
which matches the recursive nature of nxt. The last example in Table 2.2 demonstrates a
shadow type for a structure with multiple pointers. As shown in the table, each pointer is
translated to a structure with two pointers, an ROP and an NSOP, and the integer from the
original structure is dropped from the shadow type.
Shadow types can be computed with the algorithm shown in Figure 2.5. Much of the
algorithm is a straightforward interpretation of the shadow type definition; however, three
aspects deserve explanation. First, a dynamic programming approach is utilized for temporal
efficiency. Once a shadow type is computed for a type t, it is stored in the global map ST .
Second, if a derived type is not composed of pointers outside of function types, then the
algorithm can short-circuit and return null. That behavior is performed by the check in
line 17. Third, the algorithm must be able to process recursive types. Type recursion
can only occur through pointers. The majority of the work of processing a pointer type
τ∗ consists of computing its NSOP via a recursive call to getShadowTypeImpl(). Prior to
making that recursive call, we create a placeholder ph to be used in place of nsop, if nsop is
needed during the recursive computation of itself. Upon completion of that computation, we
resolve instances of ph to the computed value of nsop (line 10). Placeholder resolution can
be implemented by assigning a unique type name to the type stored in nsop and replacing
instances of ph with that name.
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Input t: A type
Output Return the shadow type of t.
getShadowType(t)
1: map P ← ∅
2: return getShadowTypeImpl(t, P )
Input t: A type
PhMap: Mapping of types to placeholders
Globals ST : Mapping of a type to its shadow type
Output Return the shadow type for t. The returned type may be partially computed.
getShadowTypeImpl(t, ref map PhMap)
1: if (t ∈ ST ) then return ST [t]
2: if (t = τ∗) then
3: if (t ∈ PhMap) then
4: return struct{t;PhMap[t]}
5: ph← getPlaceHolder()
6: PhMap[t]← ph
7: st← getShadowTypeImpl(τ , PhMap)
8: if (st = ∅) then nsop← void∗
9: else nsop← st∗
10: resolvePlaceHolderTo(ph, nsop)
11: rv ← struct{t;nsop; }
12: if (!containsPlaceHolder(t) ∧ !containsPlaceHolder(rv))
13: PhMap← PhMap− {t}
14: ST [t]← rv
15: return rv
16: else
17: if (!containsPointerOutsideFunType(t)) then rv ← ∅
18: if (t = array{τ}) then
19: st← getShadowTypeImpl(τ , PhMap)
20: rv ← array{st}
21: if (t = struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; }) then
22: for i = 0 to n
23: sti ← getShadowTypeImpl(τi, PhMap)
24: rv ← struct{st0; . . . ; stn; }
25: if (t = union{τ0; . . . ; τn; }) then
26: for i = 0 to n
27: sti ← getShadowTypeImpl(τi, PhMap)
28: rv ← union{st0; . . . ; stn; }
29: ST [t]← rv
30: return rv
Figure 2.5: Algorithm for getShadowType
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Table 2.3: Augmented type definition
Description Original Type t Replica Parameter Type rpt(t)
pointer τ∗ at(τ)∗
other τ ∅
Description Original Type t Shadow Parameter Type spt(t)
pointer
τ∗ : st(τ) 6= ∅ st(at(τ))∗
τ∗ : st(τ) = ∅ void∗
other τ ∅
Description Original Type t Augmented Type at(t)
array τ [] at(τ)[]
struct struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; } struct{at(τ0); . . . ; at(τn); }
union union{τ0; . . . ; τn; } union{at(τ0); . . . ; at(τn); }
pointer τ∗ at(τ)∗
function types r(τ0, . . . , τn)
at(r)(st(at(r))∗,
at(τ0), rpt(τ0), spt(τ0), . . . ,
at(τn), rpt(τn), spt(τn))
primitive and void types τ τ
2.3 Augmented Functions
With SDS we have a method for mapping application pointers stored in memory to replica
pointers; however, we also need a way to map application pointers that are passed and
returned across function calls to replica and shadow pointers. That can be achieved by
modifying function types and function calls to allow those replica and shadow pointers to
be passed and returned when application pointers are passed and returned, respectively.
DPMR transforms all types used by a program into augmented types (at()). Under such a
transformation, most program types remain the same, with only those that contain function
types actually changing.
Augmented types are defined in Table 2.3. Following from our assumptions about program
input (see the beginning of this chapter), the only function argument and return value
types that can contain pointers are ones that are themselves pointers. Therefore, when
transforming function types, we need identify only pointer parameters and pointer return
values. For all pointer parameters, we add two additional parameters to the function type,
one for an ROP and one for an NSOP. For functions that return a pointer, a shadow object
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Table 2.4: Example of an augmented type
Original Type Augmented Type
int8[]* (int8[]* s1, int8[]* (struct int8ArrayPtrSdwTy* rvSop,
int8[]* s2); int8[]* s1, int8[]* s1Rop, void* s1Nsop,
int8[]* s2, int8[]* s2Rop, void* s2Nsop);
pointer parameter is added.1 That shadow object pointer is used to point to memory where
called functions can store an ROP and NSOP pertaining to their return value. The ROP and
NSOP can then be loaded by the caller. Table 2.4 contains an example of the transformation
of a function type to an augmented function type. The function type in the example takes
two pointers to arrays of 8-bit integers and returns a pointer to an array of 8-bit integers.
The augmented function type has a parameter rvSop that is a pointer to the shadow type
of the return value, which was previously defined in Table 2.2. It also has ROP and NSOP
parameters corresponding to the original parameters s1 and s2.
The algorithms for computing augmented types are much more complicated than those
for computing shadow types. The algorithms for computing augmented function types are
contained in Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. The getAugTypeImpl() algorithm in Figure 2.6 contains
the main loop for computing augmented types. It recursively calls itself and hands the
processing of function types to getAugFunTypeImpl(), described in Figure 2.7. At several
points during the calculation of an augmented function type, we require the shadow type of
the augmented type of an input type. That computation is handled by getShadowAugType(),
in Figure 2.8.
Several features of those algorithms deserve discussion. First, as we did when computing
shadow types, we use a dynamic programming approach. Completely resolved augmented
types are stored to and retrieved from the global map AT . Second, recursive data types
are handled using placeholders and placeholder resolution. Given a pointer τ∗ for which
we want to compute at(τ∗), we use placeholders to represent at(τ∗) for recursive references
that are required during the computation of at(τ∗). Lines 5 and 9 from getAugTypeImpl(),
in Figure 2.6, and the placeholder map P2 comprise the placeholder elements that aid in
1In the augmented type definition, an st(at(r))∗ type is added to all function types; however, that type
will only be non-null if the function’s return value is a pointer.
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Input t: A type
Output Returns the augmented type of t.
getAugType(t)
1: map P1← ∅
2: map P2← ∅
3: return getAugTypeImpl(t, P1, P2)
Input t: A type
P1: Mapping of types to placeholders
P2: Mapping of types to placeholders
Globals AT : Mapping of a type to its augmented type
Output Returns the augmented type of t. The return value may be partially computed.
getAugTypeImpl(t, ref map P1, ref map P2)
1: if (t ∈ AT ) return AT [t]
2: if (t = rt(a0, . . . , an)) then return getAugFunTypeImpl(t, P1, P2)
3: if (t = τ∗) then
4: if t ∈ P2 then return P2[t]
5: ph← getPlaceHolder()
6: P2[t]← ph
7: at← getAugTypeImpl(τ , P1, P2)
8: rv ← at∗
9: resolvePlaceHolderTo(ph, rv)
10: if (!containsPlaceHolder(t) ∧ !containsPlaceHolder(rv))
11: P2← P2− {t}
12: AT [t]← rv
13: return rv
14: else
15: if (isIntegerType(t) ∨ isFloatingPointType(t) ∨ t = void) then rv ← t
16: if (t = array{τ}) then
17: at← getAugTypeImpl(τ , P1, P2)
18: rv ← array{at}
19: if (t = struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; }) then
20: for i = 0 to n
21: ati ← getAugTypeImpl(τi, P1, P2)
22: rv ← struct{at0; . . . ; atn; }
23: if (t = union{τ0; . . . ; τn; }) then
24: for i = 0 to n
25: ati ← getAugTypeImpl(τi, P1, P2)
26: rv ← union{at0; . . . ; atn; }
27: AT [t]← rv
28: return rv
Figure 2.6: Algorithm for getAugType
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Input t: A function type that equals rt(a0, . . . , an)
P1: Mapping of types to placeholders
P2: Mapping of types to placeholders
Globals AT : Mapping of a type to its augmented type
Output Returns the augmented type of t. The return value may be partially computed.
getAugFunTypeImpl(t = rt(a0, . . . , an), ref map P1, ref map P2)
1: list ArgList← ∅
2: at← getAugTypeImpl(rt, P1, P2)
3: if (rt = τ∗) then
4: st← getShadowAugType(rt, P1, P2)
5: ArgList = ArgList ∪ {st∗}
6: for i = 0 to n
7: at← getAugTypeImpl(ai, P1, P2)
8: ArgList = ArgList ∪ {at}
9: if (ai = τ∗) then
10: st← getShadowAugType(ai, P1, P2)
11: ArgList = ArgList ∪ getElement(st, 0) ∪ getElement(st, 1)
12: AT [t]← at(ArgList)
13: return at(ArgList)
Figure 2.7: Algorithm for getAugFunTypeImpl
the computation of at(τ∗). Placeholders can be implemented as discussed at the end of
Section 2.2.
The third interesting feature of the algorithms for computing augmented types is that
they do not call either getShadowType() or getShadowTypeImpl(). Instead, they call getShad-
owAugType(), which is very similar to getShadowTypeImpl() but with a few subtle changes
that allow it to compute st(at(t)) without first computing at(t). The reason we do not want
to compute at(t) first is that at the point in the algorithm where we would compute st(at(t)),
at(t) may contain unresolved placeholders. To avoid complications that would arise from
processing a type containing unresolved placeholders, we compute st(at(t)) in one calcula-
tion. We can compute st(at(t)) in one calculation by implementing the composite function
(st ◦ at)(t) given in Table 2.5.
2.4 Code Transformation
In this section, we define the code transformations that transform an input program for SDS-
based DPMR. The transformations convert a program to use augmented types and shadow
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Input t: A type
P1: Mapping of types to placeholders
P2: Mapping of types to placeholders
Globals SAT : Mapping of type x to the shadow type of the augmented type of x
Output Return the shadow type of the augmented type of t. The return value may be partially
computed.
getShadowAugType(t, ref map P1, map ref P2)
1: if (t ∈ SAT ) then return SAT [t]
2: if (t = τ∗) then
3: if (t ∈ P1) then
4: at← getAugType(t, P1, P2)
5: SAT [t]← struct{at;P1[t]}
6: return struct{at;P1[t]}
7: ph← getPlaceHolder()
8: P1[t]← ph
9: sat← getShadowAugType(τ , P1, P2)
10: if (sat = ∅) then nsop← void∗
11: else nsop← sat∗
12: resolvePlaceHolderTo(ph, nsop)
13: at← getAugType(t, P1, P2)
14: rv ← struct{at;nsop; }
15: if (!containsPlaceHolder(t) ∧ !containsPlaceHolder(rv))
16: P1← P1− {t}
17: SAT [t]← rv
18: return rv
19: else
20: if (!containsPointerOutsideFunType(t)) then rv ← ∅
21: if (t = array{τ}) then
22: sat← getShadowAugType(τ , P1, P2)
23: rv ← array{sat}
24: if (t = struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; }) then
25: for i = 0 to n
26: sati ← getShadowAugType(τi, P1, P2)
27: rv ← struct{sat0; . . . ; satn; }
28: if (t = union{τ0; . . . ; τn; }) then
29: for i = 0 to n
30: sati ← getShadowAugType(τi, P1, P2)
31: rv ← union{sat0; . . . ; satn; }
32: SAT [t]← rv
33: return rv
Figure 2.8: Algorithm for getShadowAugType
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Table 2.5: Composed type definition for (st ◦ at)(t)
Description Original Type t Composed Type (st ◦ at)(t)
array τ [] (st ◦ at)(τ)[]
struct struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; } struct{(st ◦ at)(τ0); . . . ; (st ◦ at)(τn); }
union union{τ0; . . . ; τn; } union{(st ◦ at)(τ0); . . . ; (st ◦ at)(τn); }
pointer
τ∗ : (st ◦ at)(τ) 6= ∅ struct{at(τ)∗; (st ◦ at)(τ)∗; }
τ∗ : (st ◦ at)(τ) = ∅ struct{at(τ)∗; void∗}
primitive, function,
and void types
τ ∅
data structures. Before presenting the transformations, we introduce some helpful functions
in Equations 2.1 to 2.4. I() takes a Boolean value and converts false to 0 and true to 1. φ()
takes a structure type and a pointer field and returns the index of the corresponding field in
t’s shadow type. γ() takes a virtual register and converts it to a set of virtual registers that
are used in function calls and declarations under DPMR. pi() takes the type of a function’s
return value and converts it to a set of arguments that are added to function calls with that
return type.
I : {false, true} 7→ {0, 1} (2.1)
φ(t, fi) ≡
i−1∑
j=0
I(st(at(τj)) 6= ∅) : t = struct{τ0 f0; . . . ; τn fn; }, type(fi) = β∗ (2.2)
γ(r) ≡


{r, rr, rs} if type(r) = τ∗
{r} else
(2.3)
pi(t) ≡


{rvSop} if t = τ∗
∅ else
(2.4)
The DPMR code transformation is found in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The cases in Table 2.6
take original program behavior and add to it, while the cases in Table 2.7 take original
program behavior and replace it. For a virtual register p in the original program holding a
pointer, the transforms create virtual registers pr and ps that hold the corresponding ROP
and NSOP, respectively. The transform will assign values to pr and ps whenever p is assigned
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Table 2.6: DPMR transformation – added behavior
Description Original Behavior Added Behavior
heap
deallocation
free(p)
free(pr)
if(ps != null){ free(ps) }
store *p ← x
type(x) 6= τ∗ *pr ← x
type(x) = τ∗
*pr ← x
(ps->f) ← xr
(ps->f) ← xs
load x ← *p
type(x) 6= τ∗ assert(x == *pr)
type(x) = τ∗
assert(x == *pr)
xr ← (ps->f)
xs ← (ps->f)
address of a
struct field
x ← &(p->fi) :
type(p) = struct{
τ f; . . . ; τn fn; }∗
st(at(τi)) 6= ∅
xr ← &(pr->fi)
xs ← &(ps->fφ(type(∗p),fi))
st(at(τi)) = ∅
xr ← &(pr->fi)
xs ← null
address of an
array element
x ← &p[i] :
type(p) = τ []∗
st(at(τ)) 6= ∅
xr ← &pr[i]
xs ← &ps[i]
st(at(τ)) = ∅
xr ← &pr[i]
xs ← null
address of a
function
p ← &fun
pr ← &fun
ps ← null
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Table 2.7: DPMR transformation – transformed behavior
Description Original Behavior Transformed Behavior
allocation
p ← allocate(τ) :
allocate = {malloc|
alloca|global}
st(at(τ)) 6= ∅
p ← allocate(at(τ))
pr ← allocate(at(τ))
ps ← allocate(st(at(τ)))
st(at(τ)) = ∅
p ← allocate(at(τ))
pr ← allocate(at(τ))
ps ← null
pointer-to-
pointer
cast
q ← (τ∗)p
st(at(τ)) 6= ∅
q ← (at(τ)∗)p
qr ← (at(τ)∗)pr
qs ← (st(at(τ))∗)ps
st(at(τ)) = ∅
q ← (at(τ)∗)p
qr ← (at(τ)∗)pr
qs ← (void∗)ps
function
declaration
fun(pi(r) ∪ (
n⋃
i=
γ(ai))) :fun(a, . . . , an) :
type(fun) = r(τ, . . . , τn)
type(fun) = at(r(τ, . . . , τn))
function call
x ← fun(p, . . . , pn) :
type(fun) = r(. . .)
r = τ∗
rvSop ← alloca(st(at(r)))
x ← fun({rvSop} ∪ (
n⋃
i=
γ(pi)))
xr ← (rvSop->f)
xs ← (rvSop->f)
r 6= τ∗ x ← fun(
n⋃
i=
γ(pi))
function
return
return x
type(x) = τ∗
(rvSop->f) ← xr
(rvSop->f) ← xs
return x
type(x) 6= τ∗ return x
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a value. Below, we describe each case in the transformation.
• allocation: When a program allocates memory, whether in the heap, stack, or global
variables, then the allocation type must be changed to an augmented type. In addition,
DPMR allocates a replica block of memory in the same memory segment, also using
the augmented allocation type. If the allocated type contains a pointer (outside of
function types), then a shadow object is also allocated. If the shadow type of the
augmented allocation type is null, then the corresponding NSOP is set to null.
• heap deallocation: When memory is deallocated from the heap, we deallocate the
corresponding replica object from the heap. DPMR also inserts a check to see if the
NSOP is non-null; if it is, the shadow object corresponding to the application object is
deallocated. We perform the null-check at runtime, in case the static (compile-time)
type is not precise enough to determine if a shadow object should be deallocated.
• store: Whenever the original program stores a value to memory, DPMR stores an
identical value to replica memory. If the value that is stored to memory is a pointer,
then we store the corresponding ROP and NSOP to shadow memory.
• load : When the application loads a value from memory, we load the corresponding
value from replica memory and compare the two. If the two values differ, then DPMR
has detected a memory error. If the value that is loaded from memory is a pointer,
then DPMR loads a corresponding ROP and NSOP from shadow memory.
• address of a structure field : If a program computes the address of a structure field for
an application object, DPMR computes the address of the same structure field for the
corresponding replica object. If the application object contains pointers (outside of
function types), then we must also compute the address of the appropriate field in the
corresponding shadow object. The φ() function converts field indices of application
structures to field indices of shadow structures.
• address of an array element : If the address is computed for an array element stored in
memory, then we compute the address of the corresponding array element in replica
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memory. If the array contains pointers (outside of function types), then we will also
compute the address of a corresponding array element in shadow memory.
• pointer-to-pointer cast : When the program under transformation performs a pointer-
to-pointer cast of type τ∗ on a pointer p, that cast is transformed into an at(τ)∗ cast.
In addition, p’s ROP is cast to that same augmented pointer type. If the shadow type
of the new pointed-to type is non-null, then an st(at(τ))∗ cast is applied to p’s NSOP.
• address of a function: DPMR processes operations that take the address of a function
a bit differently from other pointer operations. There are no replica functions from
which to compute replica pointers. Furthermore, function pointers are never directly
dereferenced, i.e., they are only dereferenced by function calls. Therefore, we use the
same pointer value for a function pointer and its ROP. In addition, there is no need
for the NSOP to reference a shadow object, because it will never be dereferenced.
Therefore, it can simply be set to null.
• function declaration: DPMR transforms original function declarations to use aug-
mented function types. The transformation adds ROPs and NSOPs corresponding
to pointer arguments. In addition, if the return value of the function is a pointer,
then a pointer argument is added, so the function can store to it an ROP and NSOP
corresponding to the return value.
• function call : Function calls are transformed so that ROPs and NSOPs corresponding
to input program pointer parameters can be passed to the called function. If the called
function returns a pointer, it will need to return a corresponding ROP and NSOP. That
is done through the rvSop parameter. The calling function allocates memory on the
stack to which the callee stores the return pointer’s ROP and NSOP. After the function
call, the caller loads the ROP and NSOP.
• function return: If function return instructions return a pointer, then DPMR stores the
pointer’s ROP and NSOP in the memory pointed to by the function’s rvSop argument.
• global variable initialization: Global variable initialization is not explicitly specified in
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Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Global variable initialization can be thought of as a series of non-
pointer operations, pointer arithmetic, and store operations that the compiler performs
at compile time. When thought of in that way, global variable initialization can be
transformed according to the rules in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show examples of how DPMR transforms code. Both use the types
defined in Table 2.2. We first examine the example in Figure 2.9. The code on the left
side is from an input program that creates a linked list node and potentially attaches it to
an existing linked list. The code on the right is code transformed by DPMR. The typedef
declarations at the top of both pieces of code are there for convenience. Below, we discuss
how several parts of the original code are transformed.
1. The declaration of createNode() is transformed to an augmented type. The trans-
formation includes addition of the rvSop argument that points to memory to hold the
return value’s ROP and NSOP, as well as addition of an ROP parameter and NSOP
parameter that corresponds to the argument last.
2. The heap allocation in the input program is transformed into three heap allocations:
one for an application object, one for a replica object, and one for a shadow object.
3. There are several examples of pointer arithmetic in the original program. We will
discuss the one at line 19. In that line, the original program computes the address of
the nxt field in an LL structure. DPMR adds an instruction to compute the address
of the nxt field in replica memory. It also adds an instruction to compute the address
of the corresponding field in the LLSdwTy structure.
4. The original code contains both a non-pointer store and a pointer store. The data
stored to application memory in line 17 are also stored to replica memory in line 18. In
line 33, the original program stores a pointer to memory. DPMR adds three additional
stores. It stores the same pointer to replica memory in line 34. It then stores a
corresponding ROP and NSOP to shadow memory, in lines 35 and 36.
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1 typedef struct LinkedList LL;
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 LL* createNode(int32 data, LL* last){
9
10
11 LL* n = malloc(LL);
12
13
14 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
15
16
17 *dataPtr = data;
18
19 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
20
21
22
23 *nxtPtr = NULL;
24
25
26
27 if(last){
28 LL* lastNxtPtr = &(last->nxt);
29
30
31
32
33 *lastNxtPtr = n;
34
35
36
37 }
38 return n;
39
40
41 }
(a) Original code
1 typedef struct LinkedList LL;
2 typedef struct LinkedListSdwTy
3 LLSdwTy;
4 typedef struct{
5 LL* rop;
6 LLSdwTy* nsop;
7 } LLPtrSdwTy;
8 LL* createNode(LLPtrSdwTy* rvSop,
9 int32 data, LL* last, LL* last_r,
10 LLSdwTy* last_s){
11 LL* n = malloc(LL);
12 LL* n_r = malloc(LL);
13 LLSdwTy* n_s = malloc(LLSdwTy);
14 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
15 int32* dataPtr_r = &(n_r->data);
16 void* dataPtr_s = NULL;
17 *dataPtr = data;
18 *dataPtr_r = data;
19 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
20 LL* nxtPtr_r = &(n_r->nxt);
21 LLPtrSdwTy* nxtPtr_s =
22 &(n_s->nxtSdwObj);
23 *nxtPtr = NULL;
24 *nxtPtr_r = NULL;
25 nxtPtr_s->rop = NULL;
26 nxtPtr_s->nsop = NULL;
27 if(last){
28 LL* lastNxtPtr = &(last->nxt);
29 LL* lastNxtPtr_r =
30 &(last_r->nxt);
31 LLPtrSdwTy* lastNxtPtr_s =
32 &(last_s->nxtSdwObj);
33 *lastNxtPtr = n;
34 *lastNxtPtr_r = n;
35 lastNxtPtr_s->rop = n_r;
36 lastNxtPtr_s->nsop = n_s;
37 }
38 rvSop->rop = n_r;
39 rvSop->nsop = n_s;
40 return n;
41 }
(b) Transformed code
Figure 2.9: Transformation of createNode()
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1 int32 getSum(LL* n){
2
3 int32 sum = 0;
4 while(n){
5 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
6
7
8 int32 v = *dataPtr;
9
10 sum += v;
11 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
12
13
14
15 n = *nxtPtr;
16
17
18
19 }
20 return sum;
21 }
(a) Original code
1 int32 getSum(LL* n, LL* n_r,
2 LLSdwTy* n_s){
3 int32 sum = 0;
4 while(n){
5 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
6 int32* dataPtr_r = &(n_r->data);
7 void* dataPtr_s = NULL;
8 int32 v = *dataPtr;
9 assert(v == *dataPtr_r);
10 sum += v;
11 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
12 LL* nxtPtr_r = &(n_r->nxt);
13 LLPtrSdwTy* nxtPtr_s =
14 &(n_s->nxtSdwObj);
15 n = *nxtPtr;
16 assert(n == *nxtPtr_r);
17 n_r = nxtPtr_s->rop;
18 n_s = nxtPtr_s->nsop;
19 }
20 return sum;
21 }
(b) Transformed code
Figure 2.10: Transformation of getSum()
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5. The final transformation we examine is the transformation of createNode()’s return
instruction. Since the original program returns the pointer n, DPMR adds two instruc-
tions to store n’s ROP and NSOP to the memory pointed to by rvSop. A caller of
createNode() can load the ROP and NSOP from memory after calling createNode().
We now examine the code transformations that take place in Figure 2.10. Several of the
transformations that are made to getSum() have already been illustrated with the transfor-
mation of createNode(), so we will focus on the loads, which were not previously illustrated.
In line 8 of the original getSum() code, an integer is loaded from memory. The DPMR trans-
formation adds a replica load in line 9, and the replicated load value is compared with the
original program load value. If the two values are not equal, a memory error has been de-
tected, and DPMR aborts the program. Line 15 from the original input program contains a
load whose loaded value is a pointer. DPMR adds three instructions as a result. In line 16,
DPMR replicates the load from replica memory and compares the extracted pointer with
the pointer loaded from application memory. If the two pointers are not equal, then DPMR
aborts the program. In addition, DPMR loads a corresponding ROP and NSOP from shadow
memory.
2.5 Detection Conditions
Now that the transformations for DPMR have been defined, we examine how software mem-
ory errors behave in the presence of DPMR. During that examination, we assume that an
application’s operating environment is fault-free. Only the application can be faulty.
As defined in Section 1.3, our error model consists of out-of-bounds accesses, dangling
pointer uses, wild pointer uses, and uninitialized reads. DPMR will detect one of those
errors only if the error manifests such that an application load and the replicated load added
by DPMR produce different values. Below, we will examine conditions under which the
various errors will lead to DPMR detection.
42
2.5.1 Write Errors
Our error model includes three types of write errors, i.e., buffer overflows, writes after free,
and wild pointer writes. In this section, we examine the ways that those write errors can
manifest and which of those ways DPMR will detect.
• unpaired corruption of replicated memory : Let A and B be two bytes that are paired
via DPMR replication. Assume that a write error corrupts memory such that A and
B have different values, producing an unpaired corruption of replicated memory. If
one-half of a replicated load pair reads A at load offset i, and the other half of the
replicated load pair reads B at load offset i, then DPMR will detect the error. Note
that if a replicated load reads A at offset i and B at an offset other than i, then that
is a read error, which we discuss below.
• paired corruption: If a write error corrupts two bytes in memory that are paired via
DPMR replication, and the same data value is written to both bytes, DPMR will not
be able to detect the corruption of those bytes. Since the corruption is not immediately
detectable by DPMR, it can lead to arbitrary behavior.
• shadow object corruption: If an ROP is corrupted, it becomes a wild pointer. If it
is loaded, it can lead to additional memory errors. If an NSOP is corrupted, it can
lead to loading of wild ROPs and wild NSOPs. Additional memory errors will occur
if those wild ROPs and NSOPs are used to access memory.
• other corruptions : Memory that is not replicated and does not hold a shadow object
can also be corrupted. Such memory includes heap metadata, stack metadata, and
variables that are pushed to memory after the DPMR transformation, due to register
pressure. If a write error corrupts such memory, then arbitrary behavior can occur.
2.5.2 Read Errors
We now consider read errors. Our target error model includes four read errors: out-of-
bounds reads, reads after free, wild pointer reads, and uninitialized reads. Three situations
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can result from read errors.
• different values : A read error can cause a replicated load to read two different values
from memory. If that happens, DPMR will detect the error.
• same correct value: A read error can cause a replicated load to read two identical
values from memory that match the value that should be loaded from memory, even
though the replicated load targets two incorrect memory locations. In that case, the
error will not lead to a failure and will not be detected.
• same incorrect value: The last way that a read error can manifest is by causing a
replicated load to read identical values from memory that are not correct. If such a
case arises, DPMR detection will not detect the error at the time of the replicated load,
resulting in arbitrary behavior. That could happen, for example, if a read error causes
a replicated load to read from two locations in memory that are paired via DPMR
replication. However, one goal of the diversity that DPMR employs is to reduce the
likelihood of such situations.
2.5.3 Free Errors
Finally, we examine free errors, which include out-of-bounds frees, double frees, and wild
pointer frees. Free errors can produce the following behaviors.
• heap buffer free: If at least one heap buffer is freed by a free error, then the error can
be detected if the buffer is reallocated. Let A be a heap buffer that is erroneously
freed by a free error. Let B be the buffer that is paired with A at the time of the
erroneous free. If A is reallocated and paired with a buffer other than B, then the use
of replicated pointers that point to A and B, that would be valid if the free error had
not taken place, will cause additional write, read, and free errors that can be detected
by DPMR.
• protected memory pointer free: If a pointer points to protected memory and is freed,
then the result will be a crash.
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• free of other pointers : If a freed pointer does not point either to the start of a heap
buffer or to protected memory, then it could lead to a crash or memory corruption. A
crash would occur if error checking in the heap allocator detects that the free is invalid.
If a crash does not occur, memory corruption could occur. Many heap allocators store
heap metadata in freed buffers. Therefore, if p is erroneously freed, heap metadata
may be written into the buffer to which p points, causing a corruption. Such corruption
could be detected by DPMR much as other write errors are.
2.6 Diversity Transformations
In this section, we describe several diversity transformations that are evaluated with DPMR
in subsequent chapters. The transformations explicitly introduce diversity into replica be-
havior, beyond the implicit diversity afforded by intra-process replication, as discussed in
Section 2.1. Although the diversity transformations discussed here affect the allocation and
deallocation of heap objects, similar techniques could easily be applied to stack memory
and global variable memory in a production version of DPMR. The diversity mechanisms
presented here were strategically chosen, as discussed below; however, there are certainly
other reasonable transformations that could be used in the future.
The diversity transformations evaluated under DPMR are defined in Table 2.8. The second
column of the table contains original program behavior before DPMR has been applied. The
third column contains replica behavior as defined by the standard DPMR transformations
described in Section 2.4. Each diversity technique transforms the replica behavior as defined
in the fourth column. Any other behavior defined in the standard DPMR transformations
still applies.
The first diversity transformation that DPMR uses is pad-malloc. Pad-malloc increases
the request size for replica heap allocation requests by a static amount. In the experimental
studies presented in this dissertation, increases of 8, 32, 256, and 1024 bytes are evaluated.
Pad-malloc was chosen as a mechanism explicitly targeting buffer overflows. Buffer overflows
out of application objects can immediately corrupt other objects, while the initial portion of
an overflow out of a replica object will write to unused padding. Even if the overflow runs
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Table 2.8: Diversity transformations
Original Replica Diverse
Description Behavior Behavior Replica Behavior
pad-malloc-y x ← malloc(τ) xr ← malloc(at(τ))
xr ← (at(τ)∗)malloc(
int8[sizeof(at(τ)) + y])
zero-before-
free
free(p) free(pr)
tmp1 ← heapBufSize(pr)
tmp2 ← 0
while(tmp2 < tmp1){
((int8[]*)pr)[tmp2] ← 0
tmp2 ← tmp2+1
}
free(pr)
rearrange-
heap x ← malloc(τ) xr ← malloc(at(τ))
B ← global(void*[20])
tmp1 ← randInt(1,20)
tmp2 ← 0
while(tmp2 < tmp1){
B[tmp2] ← malloc(at(τ))
tmp2 ← tmp2+1
}
xr ← malloc(at(τ))
tmp2 ← 0
while(tmp2 < tmp1){
free(B[tmp2])
tmp2 ← tmp2+1
}
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beyond the padding, the remaining portion will potentially corrupt fewer bytes of actual
data than the overflow from application memory will, causing the two overflows to manifest
differently.
The second diversity transformation that DPMR utilizes is zero-before-free. Zero-before-
free writes zeros to the bytes of a replica buffer prior to deallocation. Zero-before-free was
chosen because of its potential to cause dangling pointer errors to manifest differently. In
particular, if a read after free occurs to an application object X, before the memory that X
and its replica Xr occupied is reallocated, the read from X will read data, while the read
from Xr will read a zero value. Assuming the values stored in X are not zero, the two reads
will differ, signaling an error.
The final diversity mechanism is rearrange-heap. When a replica heap object is allocated,
rearrange-heap gives it a random location as defined in Table 2.8, rather than the standard
location the heap allocator would normally give it. In the definition, the buffer B is a
global variable that is allocated for use by rearrange-heap and that holds up to 20 pointers.
Rearrange-heap is designed to help detect dangling pointer errors. By randomizing the
location of replica objects, it decreases the likelihood that an application object X and its
replica Xr will occupy the same pair of memory locations as a previously allocated (and
freed) application object Y and its replica Yr. If X is given the memory that Y previously
occupied and a dangling pointer to Y and Yr exists, when that dangling pointer pair is used,
the result will be a function of X but will most likely not be a function of Xr.
2.7 State Comparison Policies
In this section, we examine the state comparison policies that DPMR deploys. With respect
to the policies, a load check involves performing a replica load and comparing the result to
an application load. It should be noted that under SDS there is no point in performing a
replica load unless the result is compared to an application load. Therefore, either both the
replica load and subsequent comparison occur, or neither occurs.
The default state comparison policy used by the standard DPMR transformations is the
all loads policy, in which all of an application’s loads are replicated and compared. In
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Table 2.9: Temporal load-checking transformation
maskCounter ← global(int32)
initGlobal(maskCounter, 0)
if((mask << (64 - *maskCounter - 1)) >> (64 - 1)){
assert(x == *pr)
}
*maskCounter ← (*maskCounter + 1) % 64
Table 2.6, the comparison policy is executed with the assertion statements added by the
load transformation. Since state comparison policies are one of the primary tunable com-
ponents of DPMR, the goal of other state comparison policies is to create a performance
versus dependability trade-off among all comparison policies. That can be done by designing
comparison policies that limit the frequency of load checks.
One policy that limits that frequency is the temporal load-checking policy. Under the
temporal load-checking policy, a temporal fraction of all application loads, during runtime
execution, are replicated and compared. Temporal load-checking is accomplished by trans-
forming the assertion statements from Table 2.6, into the code in the bottom half of Table 2.9.
The code in the top half of Table 2.9 defines a global variable that is used by the code in the
bottom half. The temporal load-checking code simply keeps a counter that runs through the
bits in a mask. If the current bit is one, then the current load is replicated and compared;
otherwise, the load check is skipped. DPMR evaluates temporal load-checking with 64-bit
masks of 0x80808080 (checking 1/8 of the time), 0xAAAAAAAA (checking 1/2 of the time),
and 0xFEFEFEFE (checking 7/8 of the time).
The final state comparison policy that DPMR evaluates is static load-checking . Under
static load-checking, DPMR adds replication and comparison code for a load at compile
time, with a given probability. For example, if load checks are performed 10% of the time,
then for each load in the original program, DPMR generates a random floating pointer
number r in [0, 100) and inserts the check if r ≥ 90.
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2.8 External Code
DPMR is an interprocedural program transformation, i.e., it operates on a whole program.
A problem with many interprocedural program transformations is that an entire program
may not be available for transformation. For example, the source code may not be available
for libraries installed on a system, or it may be undesirable to transform those libraries.
External code, to which DPMR has not been applied, can be broken down into two
components: external functions and external global variables. During our treatment of
those components, we often refer to application-visible memory , i.e., memory to which an
application may receive a handle. It is differentiated from memory that an external function
uses internally but from which the external function never allows a handle to escape to
the calling application. For correctness, when accommodating external code, DPMR need
concern itself with only application-visible memory. In addition, the discussion below does
not pertain to the heap allocation and deallocation functions malloc and free, as they are
specific cases in the DPMR transformation.
We now consider external functions. Non-transformed external functions pose three pri-
mary problems for applications that are transformed with DPMR: (1) If an external function
allocates application-visible memory, corresponding replica and shadow memory will not be
allocated. (2) Stores to application-visible memory performed by external functions will not
be mimicked in an appropriate way to replica and shadow memory. (3) If an external function
returns a pointer, a corresponding ROP and NSOP will not be computed and returned to the
calling function. There are also two secondary problems: (1) If application-visible memory is
deallocated by an external function, the corresponding replica and shadow memory will not
be deallocated. That, of course, is a memory leak. (2) When an external function performs
memory loads, DPMR will miss out on opportunities to perform load checks. While those
missed load checks do not impact correctness, they may impact error coverage.
DPMR handles external functions by using external function wrappers when transform-
ing a program. An external function wrapper W for an external function E is typed using
the augmented type of E’s function type: at(type(E)). When an application is being
transformed, any references to E are replaced with references to W . An external function
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1 int8[]* strcpy(int8[]* dest, int8[]* src);
2 int8[]* strcpy_efw(int8ArrayPtrSdwTy* rvSop,
3 int8[]* dest, int8[]* dest_r, void* dest_s,
4 int8[]* src, int8[]* src_r, void* src_s){
5 assert(strcmp(src, src_r) == 0); // src is read
6 int8[]* rv = strcpy(dest, src); // perform original function
7 strcpy(dest_r, dest); // dest is written
8 rvSop->rop = dest_r; // set return value rop
9 rvSop->nsop = dest_s; // set return value nsop
10 return rv;
11 }
Figure 2.11: External function wrapper for strcpy()
wrapper has two high-level responsibilities. First, it performs the behavior of its corre-
sponding external function, most likely by calling that external function. Second, it per-
forms application-visible DPMR behavior that would occur if the corresponding external
function were transformed by DPMR. That application-visible DPMR behavior includes the
following:
1. An external function wrapper is required to allocate replica and shadow memory cor-
responding to application-visible heap memory allocated by the external function.
2. Any store by the external function to application-visible memory should be mimicked
in corresponding replica and shadow memory.
3. If the external function returns a pointer, a corresponding ROP and NSOP should be
stored to the memory pointed to by the wrapper’s rvSop argument.
4. Replica and shadow memory on the heap should be deallocated for any application-
visible heap memory that is deallocated by the external function.
5. If application-visible memory is loaded by the external function, then the wrapper
should load and compare corresponding replica memory.
An example of a wrapper is shown in Figure 2.11. The strcpy() function takes a pointer
to an array of bytes, src, and copies the bytes to the memory pointed to by dest. The bytes
pointed to by src are assumed to be terminated by a byte with a ’\0’ value. strcpy()
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copies all bytes from src up to and including the first ’\0’ value. strcpy() completes by
returning dest. strcpy()’s external function wrapper performs four tasks. Since strcpy()
reads the bytes pointed to by src, strcpy efw() verifies that src r points to bytes with the
same values. Second, the wrapper calls the original external function. Third, the wrapper
writes to dest r data that are equivalent to the data written to dest by strcpy(). Finally,
the wrapper stores the ROP and NSOP corresponding to strcpy()’s return value to the
memory pointed to by rvSop.
Since DPMR does not analyze the external functions upon which external function wrap-
pers are based, it cannot auto-generate the wrappers. Therefore, wrappers must be dis-
tributed with DPMR or written by DPMR users. Either way, wrappers for an external library
lib can be compiled into an external code support library , libDpmrSupport. libDpmrSupport
can be linked into a program that links with lib and is transformed by DPMR. Such a support
library has been constructed with wrappers for most functions in the C libc library.
In addition to external functions, DPMR must also handle external global variables. The
problem that DPMR encounters with external global variables (that it does not process) is
that corresponding replica memory and shadow memory are not allocated and initialized.
That problem can be solved by declaring and statically initializing global variable memory
for that purpose in DPMR external code support libraries. If the initial values of replica
and shadow memory, corresponding to external global variables, are not known a priori,
runtime initialization functions can be provided by DPMR external code support libraries
to be called upon program start. Note that if external functions read and write external
global variables, then the corresponding wrappers should read and write to the appropriate
replica and shadow memory.
2.9 Limitations
Unfortunately, the SDS-based DPMR approach is not without its limitations. Those limita-
tions are substantially relaxed with alternative designs discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The
SDS-based approach is evaluated first because, when applicable, it may be the preferred
approach since it allows loads that return pointers to be compared. Below, we discuss input
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program restrictions that are sufficient to allow application of SDS.
• memory allocation: At a memory allocation site A, the allocated type t must satisfy
the equation below, such that T is the set of all types that the result of A could hold
during execution.
sizeof(st(at(t))) ≥ max
τ∈T
(sizeof(st(at(τ))))
The above requirement ensures that shadow memory associated with A will be large
enough. It should be noted that another method to ensure that enough shadow memory
is allocated is to allocate 2 × sizeof(at(t)) bytes of memory for the shadow object.
That allocates enough shadow memory to handle the case in which the allocated type
contains only pointers. However, such an allocation strategy is quite wasteful.
• store: When pointers are stored to memory, they must be typed as pointers.2 When
non-pointer values are stored to memory, they must be typed as non-pointers. If those
conditions are met, we can apply the appropriate transformation for stores as shown
in Table 2.6.
• load : When pointers are loaded from memory, they must be typed as pointers,3 and
when non-pointers are loaded from memory, they must be typed as non-pointers. Much
like the requirements for stores, those requirements allow us to choose the appropriate
load transformation from Table 2.6.
• structure and array pointer arithmetic: For a pointer p to which structure or array
pointer arithmetic is applied, p must be typed in a manner that allows us to appropri-
ately address shadow memory. To precisely define that restriction, let σ() be a function
such that σ(t) is a structure that is composed of only scalar types and is structurally
equivalent4 to t. Let type(p) = s∗ and σ(at(s)) = struct{t0 f0; . . . ; tn fn; }. Let i be
the index of the field to which the pointer arithmetic advances p. Let D be the set
2That does not mean that the pointers need to be precisely or even accurately typed.
3Again, the pointers do not need to be precisely or even accurately typed.
4In this context, pointers and non-pointers are not structurally equivalent.
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of types to which p may point at runtime, in the original program. For each d ∈ D,
where σ(at(d)) = struct{τ0 e0; . . . ; τm em; }, we require that there exist a field ej such
that
sizeof(struct{t0; . . . ; ti−1; }) = sizeof(struct{τ0; . . . ; τj−1; }).
If such a field does exist, then we also require that
i−1∑
k=0
isPointer(tk) =
j−1∑
l=0
isPointer(τl).
• pointer-to-pointer casts: For a pointer-to-pointer cast p = (α∗)q, we require type
restrictions if q originated from pointer arithmetic. If
n∑
k=0
isPointer(tk) = 0 : type(q) = β∗, σ(at(β)) = struct{t0; . . . ; tn; },
then we require that
m∑
l=0
isPointer(τk) = 0 : σ(at(α)) = struct{τ0; . . . ; τm; }.
That restriction ensures that if the pointer to q’s shadow object has a null value, then
we will not cast q to a type whose shadow object has a nonzero size.
• int-to-pointer casts : Int-to-pointer casts are not allowed, because DPMR would have
no way to set corresponding ROPs and NSOPs.
• external code: SDS requires external function wrappers for all external functions uti-
lized by an input program. In addition, replica and shadow memory must be allocated
and initialized for all external global variables with which a program interacts or the
external functions that it calls interact.
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Chapter 3
Construction and Evaluation of Diverse Partial Memory
Replication
This chapter discusses the construction of a DPMR-based C compiler, followed by an ex-
perimental evaluation of DPMR. In particular, Section 3.1 addresses issues that arise when
applying DPMR to C programs, and Section 3.2 details the design of a DPMR-based C
compiler built on the LLVM [61] compiler framework. The next four sections present the
experimental framework, fault-injection framework, build procedures, and metrics that are
used when experimentally evaluating DPMR. Sections 3.7 and 3.8 analyze results from that
experimental evaluation.
3.1 Details Pertaining to C
In this section, we discuss several details that pertain to the application of DPMR to C
programs. Those details include how we handle main(), functions with variable-length
argument lists, convenient modifications that support use of libc, external global variables
from libc, and interesting external function wrappers.
3.1.1 Handling Main
There are two nonstandard details for which DPMR must account when transforming the
main() function of a C program. First, the function type of main() must not be changed.
Second, at the beginning of a program, replica memory and shadow memory will not exist
for command-line arguments. To handle the first problem, DPMR renames main() to a
unique name mainAug, prior to transforming a program. Any references to main() are
replaced with references to mainAug. Then, DPMR performs its standard transformations,
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. . . . . . . . .
argv
arg0
argvr
argn
argvs
arg0r argnr
Figure 3.1: DPMR memory for command-line arguments
the result of which contains the C function declaration:
int mainAug(int argc, char** argv, char** argv r, {char*, void*}* argv s)
Afterwards, DPMR creates a new main() that calls mainAug. That leads us to the second
problem: command-line arguments have not been replicated.
Unfortunately, the compiler cannot replicate command-line arguments at compile time
because it does not know their values. Therefore, prior to main()’s calling of mainAug,
DPMR inserts code to create and initialize replica and shadow memory corresponding to
the program’s command-line arguments. The formatting of that memory is depicted in
Figure 3.1. argv r points to an array containing values identical to those in the array to
which argv points. argv s points to an array that contains two pointers for every pointer in
the array pointed to by argv. &(argv s[i].first) points to a replica of the ith command-
line argument.
3.1.2 Functions with Variable-Length Argument Lists
Another aspect of C that DPMR must plan for is the ability of functions to have variable-
length argument lists. Before discussing how DPMR can address variable-length argument
lists, we must review the constructs that C has put in place to handle them. A va list is a
C data structure that maintains data that are necessary to access a variable-length argument
list. va start(), va end(), and va copy() are macros that are used to initialize, destroy,
and copy a va list. va arg() is a macro that extracts an argument from a variable-length
argument list.
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A strategy for handling variable-length argument lists is to have DPMR leave va list
objects, va start() calls, va end() calls, and va copy() calls untransformed. va arg()
calls that extract non-pointer arguments can also be left untransformed. For a va arg() call
that extracts a pointer argument, we transform the call so that an ROP and an NSOP, as well
as an application pointer, are extracted from a variable-length argument list. Since DPMR
transforms function arguments so that a pointer argument is immediately followed by the
ROP and NSOP corresponding to that pointer, we can replace va arg() calls that extract
pointer arguments with three va arg() calls: the first will extract an application pointer;
the second will extract the corresponding ROP; and the third will extract the corresponding
NSOP.
The above strategy works fine for code that is transformed by DPMR; however, a problem
presents itself in external function wrappers for functions that accept variable-length argu-
ment lists. Consider a function call printf("%p %d", p, 1), to which p is a pointer, and
printf() has the C type int (const char*, ...). Under DPMR, that call will be trans-
formed to printf efw("%p %d", "%p %d", NULL, p, pr, ps, 1), where printf efw()
has the C type int (const char*, const char*, void*, ...). Inside printf efw(),
we would like to call vprintf("%p %d", va),1 where va is a va list referencing a variable-
length argument list containing {p, 1}; however, we do not have a way to construct va from
the variable-length argument list {p, pr, ps, 1} that is passed to printf efw(). To get around
such problems, system-specific macros va new() and va append() could be provided for use
in external function wrappers. va new() would return a va list that references an empty
variable-length argument list. va append() would take a va list O and a data value D
as parameters and would return a va list that references a variable-length argument list
containing the contents of the list that O references followed by D. Since the implementation
of va list is system-dependent, the implementation of va new() and va append() would
also be system-dependent.
An alternative solution is to change the way function calls are transformed, so that
variable-length argument lists from the original application stay intact. That is the approach
1It is not possible for printf efw() to pass its variable-length argument list directly to a printf() call.
The prescribed solution to such a situation is for printf efw() to create a va list and pass it to vprintf().
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1 if(fp == f0 || fp == f1){
2 (*fp)(a, b, c); // fp type is void(*)(void*, ...)
3 }
4 else if(fp == g0 || fp == g1){
5 (*fp)(a, b, c); // fp type is void(*)(void*, void*, ...)
6 }
Figure 3.2: Disambiguated call type
used for the current implementation of DPMR. Table 2.7 proposed that we transform a call
site argument list {a0, . . . , an} to {a0, a0r , a0s , . . . , an, anr , ans}. In the new solution, we con-
tinue to do that for fixed arguments; however, we transform a variable-length argument list
{v0, . . . , vm} to {v0, . . . , vm, v0r , v0s , . . . , vmr , vms}.
There are two potential problems with the alternative solution. The first potential problem
is that it invalidates our strategy for transforming functions that accept variable-length
argument lists. However, that was not an issue in the applications that we transformed with
DPMR because those applications do not define their own functions that accept variable-
length argument lists. The second potential problem arises if a call site calls a function that
accepts a variable-length argument list through a function pointer. In that case, if not all of
the possible called functions have the same number of fixed pointer arguments, then we will
not know which ROPs and NSOPs correspond to variable arguments and should be placed
at the end of the call site’s argument list. The easiest way to handle that problem is to
have the compiler disambiguate function call types. For example, imagine a function call
(*fp)(a, b, c), where fp could point to f0, f1, g0, or g1, and a, b, and c are pointers.
Furthermore, the declared type of f0 and f1 is the C type void(*)(void*, ...), and the
declared type of g0 and g1 is the C type void(*)(void*, void*,...). Then, prior to
the DPMR transformation, the compiler could transform (*fp)(a, b, c) into the code in
Figure 3.2. Through that approach, each call site uses one consistent function type.
3.1.3 Convenient Modifications
We now discuss two modifications that are used in the DPMR implementation to simplify
its implementation for C input programs. The first modification concerns the C FILE type.
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In C programs, FILE pointers are passed to and/or returned by library functions such as
fopen(), fclose(), and fprintf(). However, many input C programs do not dereference
FILE pointers themselves. If that invariant is upheld, we can treat a FILE object as an
array of bytes when implementing external function wrappers. Such treatment is convenient
because it means that we can set the NSOP associated with a FILE pointer (a type that
could be system-dependent) to null. Also, when we are writing external function wrappers
for external functions that dereference FILE pointers, the DPMR behavior corresponding to
those dereferences becomes much simpler.
Another modification we make is the use of external function placeholders . External func-
tion placeholders are wrappers around external code that preserve a functional interface that
may be lost during compilation. For example, libc has several functions that check a charac-
ter for certain properties, such as isblank() and isdigit(). When generating object code
for calls to those functions on Linux, gcc transforms them into a series of instructions that
load memory returned by a call to a function called ctype b loc(). It is simpler to create
an external function wrapper for isblank() than for ctype b loc(). Therefore, to pre-
serve the isblank() interface, prior to running DPMR, we replace references to isblank()
in an input program with calls to an external function placeholder, isblank efph(). At
the time of that function replacement, we declare isblank efph() but leave it undefined.
That way, it appears as external code. Then, when DPMR runs, it can replace calls to
isblank efph() with an external function wrapper that calls isblank().
3.1.4 External Global Variables
As mentioned in Section 2.8, replica and shadow memory must be explicitly allocated and
initialized for external global variables. Four external global variables from libc often show
up in applications: stdout, stderr, stdin, and errno. DPMR includes functions that
initialize the replica and shadow memory associated with those global variables in its libc
external code support library, rather than including system-dependent static initializations.
Thus, after transforming a C program, DPMR inserts calls to those initialization functions
at the start of main(). DPMR also includes functions in its libc external code support
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library to update the replica and shadow data associated with stdout, stderr, stdin, and
errno, for use when writing external function wrappers that write to those global variables.
DPMR simplifies the implementation of those initialization and update functions by treating
FILE objects as arrays of bytes, as suggested in Section 3.1.3.
errno is a unique external global variable for two reasons. First, many libc functions
write to it. Therefore, when writing external function wrappers, it is important to pay
attention to the specific conditions under which errno may be written. For example, when
strtol() is called, errno may have been set if strtol()’s return value equals LONG MIN,
LONG MAX, or 0, or if strtol()’s base argument is 1, less than 0, or greater than 36. In
addition, malloc itself may set errno. Therefore, DPMR adds checks after every malloc
call, comparing the result to null. If the result is null, DPMR updates errno’s replica.2 The
second unique aspect of errno is that if the input program does not read errno and does
not call the few functions that do read errno, such as perror(), then as an optimization,
we can eliminate any initialization and updates of errno’s replica.
3.1.5 Interesting External Function Wrappers
The last aspect of DPMR’s application to C programs that warrants discussion is interesting
external function wrappers. In Section 2.8, we gave an example of a fairly simple external
function wrapper. Most external function wrappers are simple; however, some are not, and
we discuss several of those here. As noted in Section 2.8, malloc and free are not considered
during the writing of external function wrappers.
• printf() and scanf(): The functions in the printf() and scanf() families require
complex external function wrappers because those functions utilize variable-length
argument lists that may contain pointers that are dereferenced. When considering the
variable-length argument lists passed to those functions, DPMR is concerned only with
pointers. In order to find pointers in the variable argument lists and determine if those
pointers are used in loads or stores, DPMR must parse the format strings passed to
2Since errno is an integer stored in memory, there are no shadow data to update. Also, it is not always
an error when malloc returns null; however, it does not affect correctness to update errno’s replica.
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the printf() and scanf() family functions.
One problem with such an implementation is that format strings may be incorrect.
However, if the format string is incorrect, then any erroneous DPMR behavior that
results will potentially allow DPMR to detect the improper format string error. An-
other problem that can occur is that when a wrapper executes a printf() or scanf()
family function, that function may abort due to an environment error, such as an I/O
error. The problem is that the wrapper may not know how many of the arguments
the printf() or scanf() family function processed. However, under such circum-
stances, it is safe for the wrapper to perform load checks and store updates for pointer
arguments that would be loaded and stored, respectively, under normal operation.
It is also worth noting that printf() and scanf() family functions may change FILE
objects; however, we may not know precisely what portions of those objects are changed
by the printf() or scanf() call, without comparing the FILE object’s states before
and after the call. We can eliminate the comparison by conservatively assuming that
the entire FILE object is changed by the printf() or scanf() call. If we also assume
that FILE objects are byte arrays, as suggested in Section 3.1.3, then we can update a
FILE object’s DPMR data by simply copying the FILE object’s contents to the replica
FILE object.
• strcmp() and atof(): The strcmp() and atof() wrappers are difficult to write be-
cause strcmp() and atof() do not always indicate how much of their string arguments
have been read. For example, when two unequal strings are compared, strcmp() will
eventually return a nonzero value. However, that return value does not indicate how
much of the input strings were read to determine that they were not equal. The DPMR
external function wrapper needs to know how much of a string has been read so that
it knows how much of that string to compare to its replica. A similar situation occurs
with atof(). atof() converts a string to a floating point value. However, it stops
reading an input string when it encounters a character that is not part of that floating
point value. A wrapper for atof() compares the input string to its replica for as much
of the input string as was read. The solution to the problems posed by strcmp() and
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atof() is to have their external function wrappers emulate their string-parsing behav-
ior. In doing so, the wrappers will be able to determine how much of the underlying
string has been read. Note that if we emulate strcmp()’s string parsing behavior to
determine how much of its input strings it reads, then we are doing most of the work
that strcmp() does. Therefore, we implement strcmp() in its wrapper instead of
explicitly calling strcmp() from the wrapper.
There is a common misunderstanding that wrappers can just read input strings until
they encounter a ’\0’. However, there is no guarantee that input strings will be
terminated by a ’\0’. In fact, a program may pass nonterminated strings to strcmp()
and atof(), which it knows will terminate processing for some other reason.
• fopen() and fclose(): fopen() is unique because it returns a pointer to a FILE
object. Therefore, an external function wrapper must allocate corresponding replica
memory (and shadow memory if FILE objects are not treated as arrays of bytes).
Since we do not know how long the FILE object will live, we allocate its replica on the
heap. The question that arises is, when do we deallocate the replica? Since fclose()
effectively renders a FILE object useless, we choose to deallocate the replica (and any
shadow memory) at fclose(), despite the fact that fclose() does not necessarily
deallocate the FILE object passed to it.
• qsort(), memcpy(), and memmove(): qsort(), memcpy(), and memmove() each write
to memory in a type-generic manner. The problem with doing so is that it can violate
one of the restrictions of DPMR noted in Section 2.9, namely that pointers stored to
memory must be stored to memory as pointers. To handle that problem, we include an
extra parameter in the wrappers for qsort(), memcpy(), and memmove() that indicates
the sizes of shadow objects of parameters of those functions. The extra parameter
enables us to appropriately update shadow memory.
qsort()’s extra parameter indicates the size of the shadow objects that correspond to
the elements that qsort() sorts. The modified external function wrapper declaration
is shown in Figure 3.3, and the extra parameter is the sdwSize parameter. The extra
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1 typedef int (*CmpFTy)
2 (void*, void*);
3
4 void qsort(void* base, size_t nmemb,
5 size_t size, CmpFTy cmp);
6
7
8
9
(a) Declaration
1 typedef int (*CmpAugFTy)
2 (void*, void*, void*,
3 void*, void*, void*);
4 void qsort_efw(size_t sdwSize,
5 void* base, void* base_r,
6 void* base_s,
7 size_t nmemb, size_t size,
8 CmpAugFTy cmp, CmpAugFTy cmp_r,
9 void* cmp_s);
(b) External function wrapper declaration
Figure 3.3: Declaration of the qsort() external function wrapper
parameter for memcpy() and memmove()’s external function wrappers indicates the
entire size of the shadow memory that corresponds to the memory that is to be copied
or moved.
The value of the extra parameter that is passed to the external function wrappers of
qsort(), memcpy(), and memmove() is determined by the compiler at each call site
based on the real type of the memory passed to each of those functions. In order
to determine that type, we must impose additional restrictions similar to the ones
presented in Section 2.9.
A function type inconsistency could occur if qsort(), memcpy(), or memmove() were
called through a function pointer. That problem never occurred in the applications
we transformed. However, if it did, it would be possible to create a per-thread global
variable for each of those functions that could store the extra parameter. Then, the
extra parameter would not need to be added to the external function wrappers of
qsort(), memcpy(), and memmove().
3.2 Tool Design
DPMR is implemented using the LLVM compiler framework [61]. We make use of three
components of LLVM, namely a source code frontend, the opt transformation and analysis
engine, and a native code backend. The frontend that we utilize is gcc-based. It takes C
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Figure 3.4: DPMR tool chain
code and transforms it to bitcode, LLVM’s intermediate representation. The transformation
and analysis engine is used to analyze bitcode and/or transform it, while the backend takes
bitcode and turns it into a native library or native executable.
DPMR consists of two components. The first is the DPMR compiler, which is built
on top of LLVM’s transformation and analysis engine. The second is DPMR’s collection
of external code support libraries. The DPMR tool chain is depicted in Figure 3.4. The
source code for an input program is scanned and parsed by the gcc-based LLVM frontend,
producing bitcode. The bitcode, along with DPMR’s external code support libraries, is
fed into the DPMR compiler, where DPMR transformations are applied. The output is
DPMR-transformed bitcode. That bitcode is passed through LLVM’s optimizer (built on
opt), resulting in optimized bitcode. Finally, that optimized bitcode is passed through a
backend to produce a native executable or library.
3.3 Experimental Framework
An important part of this dissertation is the experimental evaluation of DPMR. In par-
ticular, we aim to evaluate the performance and dependability characteristics of DPMR
under different diversity transformations and state comparison policies. For the experi-
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Table 3.1: Testbed specifications
CPU AMD Athlon XP 2400+
CPU speed 2 GHz
memory size 512 MB
L2 cache size 256 KB
operating system Ubuntu 8.10 Linux
mental evaluation, we conducted two types of experiments: non-fault-injection experiments
and fault-injection experiments. The non-fault-injection experiments were used to evaluate
the performance of DPMR, and the fault-injection experiments were used to evaluate the
dependability properties of DPMR.
All experiments were conducted on a testbed of identical machines with the setup shown in
Table 3.1. The experiments were conducted when the machines were not running any other
workloads, other than standard system processes and daemons. Experiments evaluated the
following C programs from the SPEC CPU 2000 benchmarks suite [62]. Each application
was run under the train workload included with the SPEC benchmarks.
• art: Art is a floating-point application that uses a neural network to recognize objects
in a thermal image.
• bzip2: Bzip2 is the standard compression utility, but it has been modified by SPEC to
perform all compression and decompression entirely in memory. It is an integer-based
benchmark.
• equake: Equake is a floating-point simulation of seismic waves in large basins.
• mcf: Mcf is an integer-based benchmark that performs a combinatorial optimization
to determine vehicle scheduling for a public transportation company.
3.4 Fault-Injection Framework
As previously mentioned, fault-injection experiments were used to evaluate the dependability
properties of DPMR. The fault-injection framework we used is compiler-based and is designed
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to simulate software bugs. The idea was to inject into a program faulty code that will be
present every time the injected location is executed. That strategy is different from many
runtime fault-injection strategies that inject a fault once during an experiment, rather than
every time a targeted location in the code executes. Such runtime strategies are insufficient
for modeling software memory faults.
All fault injections were inserted into an input program prior to the transformation of that
program with DPMR, just as real software bugs would be present prior to transformation.
To cut down on the number of program variants needed for the experiments, we compiled a
fault-free version of a program and a faulty version that contains faulty and fault-free code
at each injection site. Command-line arguments were used to enable faulty code at specified
locations. Results in this dissertation were based on the following fault-injection types.
• heap array resize: A heap array resize reduces the number of objects requested at a
heap array allocation site. The request size can be reduced by a percentage or by a
static amount. Heap array resizes lead to out-of-bounds accesses.
• immediate free: An immediate free deallocates a heap buffer immediately following its
allocation. Immediate frees lead to reads, writes, and frees after free.
Separate experiments were conducted for each combination of fault-injection type and
possible fault-injection location. Heap array resizes that reduce heap array requests by 50%
were injected at all heap array allocation sites. In addition, immediate frees were injected
at all heap allocation sites.
It is important to note that not all enabled injections will manifest as errors. For one
thing, the code containing an enabled injection may never execute. It may be in a part of
the application that is not exercised by the current workload. It is also possible for a fault
to be executed without manifesting as an error. For example, consider a heap array resize
in which the initial malloc request is for 24 bytes, and the resize reduces it to a 16-byte
request. It is common for malloc implementations to have a minimum buffer allocation size.
Let’s say that size is 24 bytes. Then, 24 bytes will still be allocated for the reduced 16-byte
request. Static analysis is used to filter out parameters for fault injections that will definitely
not manifest, but not all request sizes are static.
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3.5 Variant Builds
In order to evaluate DPMR, an application was compiled into different variants. Each
variant was identified by the configuration under which it was compiled. Configurations
varied by whether they were compiled for fault injection and whether they were transformed
with DPMR. If a variant was transformed with DPMR, its configuration also included the
diversity transformation and state comparison policy applied to it. Variants were broken
down into four classes. Figure 3.5 depicts the compilation strategy for each of the four classes.
The compilation strategy is presented so that the reader is aware of any transformation to
and instrumentation of the original application.
The first class is represented by the rightmost path in the figure. It consists of exactly
one variant, which is an unmodified version of the original application compiled under a
standard compilation strategy. It is referred to as the golden class, or golden application.
The second class is the fi-stdapp class, represented by the leftmost compilation path. Again,
it is composed of one variant. That variant is a version of the golden application that has
been transformed for fault injection. In addition, logging and timing support have been
added for use with fault injections. The third class is the nofi-dpmr class. It represents a
group of variants that have not been modified for fault injection but have been transformed
for DPMR. The different variants are distinguished by the diversity transformation and state
comparison policy that DPMR applies to them. They do not require timing support, since
they do not involve fault injections. The third path from the left in the figure illustrates their
compilation path. The final class is the fi-dpmr class. The second compilation path from the
left in Figure 3.5 applies to it. It represents a group of variants that are compiled for fault
injection and transformed with DPMR. As with nofi-dpmr, the variants are distinguished
by the diversity transformation and state comparison policy that are applied to them. Since
fi-dpmr variants are compiled for fault injection, they require initialization for both logging
and timing.
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Figure 3.5: Compilation strategy
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3.6 Evaluation Metrics
In this section, we discuss the measurements taken in our experiments and how evaluation
metrics were derived from those measurements. An experiment is one run of an application
variant. Each experiment is identified by the tuple (W,C,D, I, RN). W is the workload. C
is the comparison policy applied to the variant if the variant is transformed with DPMR. A
comparison policy of ∅ indicates that DPMR was not used. If a variant is transformed with
DPMR, D is the diversity transformation that is applied to it. ∅ indicates that no explicit
diversity is applied. I indicates the type of fault that is injected into the target variant, if
any, and RN indicates the run number under the settings (W,C,D, I).
In every experiment, the precise exit status and wall clock running time were recorded.
For non-fault-injection experiments, the exit status was always a normal exit; but for fault-
injection experiments, it could also have been a signal exit or a timeout. Timeout values
were set to approximately 20 times the normal running time of an application under the
applied workload. The wall clock time was measured with the Linux clock gettime()
system call, using the CLOCK REALTIME parameter. In fault-injection experiments, the time
was measured between the start of an application and the first execution of fault-injection
code. That measurement is computed using the x86 read time stamp counter instruction
(rdtsc). Since the rdtsc instruction is simply a read of a CPU register, it is preferred over
more intrusive system calls. Measurements recorded using rdtsc were converted from clock
ticks to wall time using the CPU speed, as read from the Linux /proc/cpuinfo file.
Table 3.2 describes notation, experiment descriptors, and random variables that are used
to define metrics. Most items in the table are self-explanatory, but a few require further
explanation.
• successful fault injection: A fault is considered successfully injected if the corresponding
fault-injection code is executed at least once during the experiment. A successful fault
injection does not imply the manifestation of an error. In fact, without intrusive
instrumentation, error manifestation cannot be precisely determined. Therefore, error
manifestation is not computed.
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Table 3.2: Measurement components
Notation
Ps[X] sample density function for the random variable X
µ[X] sample mean of X
Experiment Descriptors
C current state comparison policy
D current diversity transformation
F true for a fault-injection experiment
Random Variables
T running time of the current experiment
SF true for a successful fault injection
CO true if the experiment produces the correct output
Ndet true if a fault is naturally detected
Ddet true if a fault is detected by DPMR
T2D time to fault detection
StdNotAllDet true if Ps[(Ndet|C = ∅, D = ∅, F, SF,¬CO) = 1] < 1
• correct output: Correct output indicates that an experiment produced the output that
the golden run would have produced under the same workload. Therefore, incorrect
output includes not only “bad” results but also error detection. It is a literal interpre-
tation of the term.
• natural detection: Natural error detection is error detection that is implicit to the
application under study and can occur in two ways. An error is naturally detected if
the application variant in an experiment crashes. An error is also naturally detected
if the variant produces application-dependent output indicating that an error was
detected. Such output might be an error message written to stderr or an exit with an
error-identifying return value.
• time to fault detection: Time to fault detection is computed by subtracting the time
between an experiment’s start and the first successful fault injection, from the total
experiment time. Two points require further clarification. First, the time to error
detection is not computed because, as mentioned earlier, there is not a nonintrusive
way to determine when a fault has manifested as an error. Second, time to detection
cannot be directly computed because, if a variant abnormally exits, there is no way to
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record the value of a timer.
• StdNotAllDet: StdNotAllDet is true for a given fault injection if, under the nofi-
stdapp variant, there is at least one run that produces incorrect output but not natural
error detection.
Below are the measurements used to evaluate DPMR.
• overhead: Overhead is defined in the non-fault-injection case, for a given comparison
policy c and diversity transformation d, as the mean execution time divided by the
mean execution time of the golden variant. More formally, overhead is given by
overhead ≡
µ[T |C = c,D = d,¬F ]
µ[T |C = ∅, D = ∅,¬F ]
. (3.1)
• coverage: A fault is considered covered in successful fault-injection experiments, for
a given comparison policy c and diversity mechanism d, if the experiment produces
correct output or an error is detected. It is formally defined as
coverage ≡ CO ∨Ndet ∨Ddet|C = c,D = d, F, SF . (3.2)
In addition to overall coverage, each of its components is examined, i.e., [CO|(C =
c,D = d, F, SF )], [(Ndet,¬CO)|(C = c,D = d, F, SF )], and [(Ddet,¬CO)| (C =
c,D = d, F, SF )].
• conditional coverage: Conditional coverage is coverage conditioned on StdNotAllDet.
It is important because it measures how a variant would perform in cases where fi-
stdapp would have produced incorrect output but would not always have detected an
error. Conditional coverage is defined as
conditional coverage ≡ CO∨Ndet∨Ddet|C = c,D = d, F, SF, StdNotAllDet. (3.3)
• detection latency: The final major metric of interest is detection latency. Detection
latency is defined in covered experiments that involve some sort of detection. Formally,
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detection latency is
detection latency ≡ T2D|C = c,D = d, F, SF,¬CO, (Ndet ∨Ddet). (3.4)
3.7 Diversity Results
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of the diversity transformations de-
scribed in Section 2.6. In particular, we examine eight application variants. One variant
is the standard application without DPMR. The second variant has been transformed with
DPMR but has had no additional diversity transformations applied to it. It relies on the
implicit diversity afforded by DPMR’s intra-process replication scheme. Each of the other
six variants has been transformed by DPMR and has had one of the following diversity
transformations applied to it: zero-before-free, rearrange-heap, pad-malloc 8, pad-malloc
32, pad-malloc 256, or pad-malloc 1024. Each variant that has been transformed with
DPMR uses the all loads state comparison policy.
We begin the evaluation of diversity transformations by examining coverage. Mean cov-
erage of heap array resizes is displayed in Figure 3.6, and mean coverage of immediate frees
is displayed in Figure 3.7. Coverage results are broken into correct output (blue), natural
detection (yellow), and DPMR detection (green). Figures 3.8 and 3.9 offer mean coverage
results across all studied applications, conditioned on incorrect output and StdNotAllDet.
We draw several observations and insights from the coverage graphs. First, coverage
numbers are high, even in the standard application (without DPMR). Coverage is high in
the stdapp variant because many faults lead to natural detection, such as a crash, or to
correct output. There are two primary reasons that an experiment might result in correct
output despite a successful fault injection. One reason is that memory corruption resulting
from a fault injection might not impact application or DPMR data that will be read before
the corruption is overwritten. Such behavior affects both heap array resizes and immediate
frees. The second reason that a successful fault injection might result in correct output
was briefly discussed in Section 3.4. Heap allocators commonly have predetermined fixed
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Figure 3.6: Mean heap array resize coverage of diversity transformations
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Figure 3.8: Mean heap array resize conditional coverage of diversity transformations
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Figure 3.9: Mean immediate free conditional coverage of diversity transformations
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sizes of memory that they allocate. Often requests will fall between two of those sizes,
and the allocator rounds up. Therefore, even if a malloc request does not ask for enough
memory for its needs, there is a chance that it will be granted enough memory for its needs.
Overallocation primarily affects heap array resizes. That is one reason that correct output
occurs more often under heap array resizes than under immediate frees.
The second observation that we make is that buffer overflows resulting from heap array
resizes are entirely covered by implicit diversity (the no-diversity variant). That suggests
that implicit diversity may be enough to detect buffer overflows. When two objects X and Y
are allocated, implicit diversity leads to layouts such as {X,Xr, Xs, Y, Yr, Ys}. That decreases
the likelihood that the objects following X and Xr are replicas of each other. Therefore, a
buffer overflow out of X (and Xr) is unlikely to corrupt paired objects, and DPMR will be
able to detect the corruption.
The third observation we make is that the rearrange-heap mechanism performs the best (in
terms of coverage) and is the only diversity mechanism to cover 100% of the injected faults.
Rearrange-heap performs well against heap array resizes for the same reasons that all of the
diversity mechanisms perform well. It performs well against the dangling pointers created
by immediate frees because its randomization decreases the likelihood that an application
object-replica pair will occupy the same memory locations as previous application object-
replica pairs. Thus, corruptions ensuing from a dangling pointer to one application object-
replica pair are not likely to corrupt the memory occupied by another application object-
replica pair in an identical way that is not detectable by DPMR.
Our final observation is that rearrange-heap produces less DPMR detection than the other
DPMR diversity policies, even though it achieves the best coverage results. Though it has
not yet been investigated, it seems reasonable that DPMR detection would tend to result in
better fault diagnosis than natural detection would because it offers an opportunity to log
process state automatically at the time of detection.
We now turn our attention to overhead. Overhead is displayed in Figure 3.10. We observe
that all overheads are between 2x and 5x, with no-diversity and zero-before-free performing
the best, and the larger pad-malloc policies performing the worst. We hypothesize that the
rearrange-heap and pad-malloc mechanisms often perform worse than the no-diversity and
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Figure 3.10: Overhead of diversity transformations
zero-before-free mechanisms because they may cause the heap allocator to cross cache page
boundaries when allocating and deallocating buffers, with the larger pad-mallocs being the
biggest offenders.
The last metric we examine is detection latency, shown in Table 3.3. Detection latency is
important because the sooner an executed fault is detected, the sooner recovery can start,
and the easier it will be to diagnose the fault. Rearrange-heap drastically outperforms the
other policies when examined under art, and it tends to have similar detection latencies to
the other policies for the other three applications.
3.8 State Comparison Policy Results
Here, we present an experimental evaluation of the comparison policies discussed in Sec-
tion 2.7. As with diversity transformations, the experiments presented here involve eight
application variants. The first variant is the standard application without DPMR. The
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Table 3.3: Mean time to detection of diversity transformations
variant
msecs
art bzip2 equake mcf
no-diversity 5773.13 268.30 224.38 6.58
h
ea
p
ar
ra
y
re
si
ze
s
zero-before-free 5684.66 262.29 220.44 6.80
rearrange-heap 54.10 128.63 285.07 9.00
pad-malloc 8 5754.66 261.77 234.74 6.95
pad-malloc 32 129.78 265.63 257.36 5.68
pad-malloc 256 154.67 266.65 443.57 8.10
pad-malloc 1024 195.55 264.34 1043.00 8.12
no-diversity 8333.10 4354.93 183.76 4.64
im
m
ed
ia
te
fr
ee
s
zero-before-free 8353.59 4298.64 178.69 90.68
rearrange-heap 43.31 4888.75 259.01 6.71
pad-malloc 8 8349.75 4407.54 201.63 7.82
pad-malloc 32 7475.46 4281.71 225.67 4.79
pad-malloc 256 7525.73 4348.99 392.98 6.29
pad-malloc 1024 7749.52 4385.43 902.89 6.09
stdapp results in this section are identical to those in Section 3.7. They are repeated
for convenient comparison with comparison policy results. The remaining seven variants
are transformed with DPMR and the rearrange-heap diversity transformation. We use
rearrange-heap because it was the best-performing diversity transformation. Each of the
seven transformed variants uses one of the following state comparison policies: all loads,
temporal load-checking 1/8, temporal load-checking 1/2, temporal load-checking 7/8, static
load-checking 10%, static load-checking 50%, and static load-checking 90%.
As with diversity transformations, we start our evaluation of comparison policies by ex-
amining coverage. Coverage of heap array resizes is depicted in Figure 3.11, and coverage of
immediate frees is shown in Figure 3.12. Coverage combined across all studied applications,
conditioned on incorrect output and StdNotAllDet, is displayed in Figures 3.13 and 3.14.
As discussed during the analysis of diversity transformations, coverage results are high, even
for the standard application without DPMR. Two other major results can be gathered from
the figures. First, coverage is robust in the face of reduced checking. What that means is
that coverage remains high even when the load-checking frequency is reduced. Second, in
our experiments, static load-checking is just as viable as temporal load-checking, suggesting
that coverage is spatially robust. When we say that coverage is spatially robust , we mean
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Figure 3.11: Mean heap array resize coverage of state comparison policies
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Figure 3.12: Mean immediate free coverage of state comparison policies
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Figure 3.14: Mean immediate free conditional coverage of state comparison policies
78
golden
all loads
temporal 1/8
temporal 1/2
temporal 7/8
static 10%
static 50%
static 90%
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 
art bzip2 equake mcf
Figure 3.15: Overhead of state comparison policies
that coverage remains high despite a large reduction in the number of load locations that
are checked. In our results, coverage was reduced only when we reduced checking to a static
10% of application loads.
We hypothesize that those results are due to two effects. First, the results may suggest
that memory faults logically propagate throughout a program. Even if we do not check
the loads that are directly affected by a fault, errors from that fault are likely to affect
other loads. That makes sense, since it is likely that the data throughout an application
are interdependent. Second, we believe that the results are affected by the periodic nature
of software bugs. Even if we do not detect a fault the first time it executes, we can detect
future executions, as particular instructions are often executed multiple times during a run
of a program.
Now, we focus on overhead. Intuitively, the primary benefit of reduced-checking policies is
a reduction in overhead. As seen in Figure 3.15, that was the case with static load-checking,
culminating in the achievement of approximately a 1/3 speedup by the static load-checking
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1 int32[]* a = ...;
2 int32[]* a_r = ...;
3 int32 sum = 0;
4 int32 i = 0;
5 for(i=0; i < 100; ++i){
6 int32 tmp1 = a[i];
7 int8 chkVal = *chkCounter;
8 if(chkVal == 0){
9 assert(tmp1 == a_r[i]);
10 }
11 *chkCounter = (chkVal+1) % 2;
12 sum += tmp1;
13 }
(a) Checking code using a counter
1 int32[]* a = ...;
2 int32[]* a_r = ...;
3 int32 sum = 0;
4 int32 i = 0;
5 for(i=0; i < 100; ++i){
6 int32 tmp1 = a[i];
7 assert(tmp1 == a_r[i]);
8 sum += tmp1;
9 ++i;
10 tmp1 = a[i];
11 sum += tmp1;
12 }
13
(b) Periodic checking code
Figure 3.16: Exploiting periodicity to improve temporal load-checking overhead
10% policy. However, it was not the case when load comparisons were temporally reduced.
To understand why temporal checking increased the overhead, we must understand that it
requires an additional check at each load to determine whether the load should be replicated
and compared. That leads to three additional sources of overhead. First, it inserts additional
computation. Second, some of that additional computation comprises branches that can lead
to expensive branch misses. Finally, we conjecture that additional branches may prevent
standard compiler optimizations from occurring that would otherwise have taken place.
We do not feel that temporal load-checking is necessarily a lost cause, but it would re-
quire aggressive optimizations to make it efficient. In particular, there are some compiler
optimizations that could increase its performance if the load-checking were performed pe-
riodically. Consider the checking code in Figure 3.16. The code on the left side performs
temporal load-checking much as the current implementation does. chkCounter is a global
variable that determines when a load should be checked. In the figure, every other load is
replicated and checked. The code on the right side of the figure exploits the periodic nature
of the checking and eliminates the branch decision that determines whether the loaded value
tmp1 should be checked. In addition, the code on the right side eliminates the need to load
and store the chkCounter global variable.
Finally, we examine detection latency, shown in Table 3.4. The major finding is that static
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Table 3.4: Mean time to detection of state comparison policies
variant
msecs
art bzip2 equake mcf
all loads 54.10 128.63 285.07 9.00
h
ea
p
ar
ra
y
re
si
ze
s
temporal 1/8 160.94 266.38 303.00 5.09
temporal 1/2 178.31 270.12 305.68 5.20
temporal 7/8 57.63 290.69 311.53 5.09
static 10% 142.43 115.50 246.63 9.86
static 50% 160.77 110.87 304.85 5.00
static 90% 50.04 124.22 285.52 8.61
all loads 43.31 4888.75 259.01 6.71
im
m
ed
ia
te
fr
ee
s
temporal 1/8 5190.58 7296.49 267.73 2.91
temporal 1/2 5711.38 7843.44 275.22 2.91
temporal 7/8 55.75 8883.58 280.99 4.05
static 10% 57.08 3155.66 241.88 9.53
static 50% 68.00 4297.55 253.03 5.43
static 90% 42.77 4682.83 259.49 6.65
load-checking detection latency tends to be approximately equal to and in some cases lower
than the all loads policy, while it tends to be higher for temporal load-checking than for the
all loads policy. The increased detection latency for temporal load-checking makes sense,
since a reduction in checking frequency should increase detection latency. On the other hand,
the static load-checking result seems anomalous. However, there are two factors that impact
detection latency: checking frequency and overhead. Although the reduced checking of static
load-checking may increase detection latency, its decreased overhead decreases detection
latency. When static load-checking has lower detection latency than all loads, that suggests
that the detection latency is dominated more by the reduced overhead than by reduced
checking.
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Chapter 4
Mirrored Data Structures
In this chapter, we explore an alternative memory layout for DPMR and compare it to
the SDS-based approach. Section 4.1 describes the new approach; Section 4.2 examines
code transformations under the new approach; Section 4.3 describes changes in the require-
ments that DPMR imposes on external code support libraries; and Section 4.4 discusses the
limitations of the new approach and how they differ from the limitations of SDS. Finally,
Section 4.5 looks at the results and places them in the context of SDS results.
4.1 The Mirrored Data Structures Approach
In Section 2.2 we discussed two memory layouts for DPMR and chose the layout based on
SDS. Here, we examine the alternative, called Mirrored Data Structures (MDS). It places
replica pointers in replica memory, as illustrated in Figure 2.2; replica memory mirrors the
layout of application memory. Since MDS does not use shadow memory, the definition
of augmented types must change. The new definition for augmented types can be found
in Table 4.1. As with SDS, augmented types affect only function types. In particular,
augmented types, under MDS, add an ROP after original pointer arguments; and if the
return value of a function is a pointer, a pointer argument is added to which the callee can
store an ROP corresponding to the pointer return value. An example of an MDS augmented
type is displayed in Table 4.2. Because the return type of the function is a pointer, the
rvRopPtr argument has been added so that an ROP can be returned to calling functions. In
addition, ROP arguments are added that correspond to the pointer arguments s1 and s2.
The downside of MDS is that pointers stored in application and replica memory are not
comparable, which has the potential to reduce coverage. Indeed, if every value stored to
82
Table 4.1: MDS augmented type definition
Description Original Type t Replica Parameter Type rpt(t)
pointer τ∗ at(τ)∗
other τ ∅
Description Original Type t Augmented Type at(t)
array τ [] at(τ)[]
struct struct{τ0; . . . ; τn; } struct{at(τ0); . . . ; at(τn); }
union union{τ0; . . . ; τn; } union{at(τ0); . . . ; at(τn); }
pointer τ∗ at(τ)∗
function types r(τ0, . . . , τn)
at(r)(rpt(r)∗, at(τ0), rpt(τ0), . . . ,
at(τn), rpt(τn))
primitive and void types τ τ
Table 4.2: Example of an MDS augmented type
Original Type Augmented Type
int8[]* (int8[]* s1, int8[]* (int8[]** rvRopPtr,
int8[]* s2); int8[]* s1, int8[]* s1Rop,
int8[]* s2, int8[]* s2Rop);
memory were a pointer, then no loads would be comparable. However, there are three
potential benefits of MDS over SDS. First, the memory footprint for a program under MDS
is less than or equal to that of the same program under SDS. They would be equal only if
nothing stored to memory is a pointer. In general, the memory overhead for SDS is 2x to
4x, while the overhead for MDS is 2x. Those calculations do not account for the fact that
DPMR increases register pressure, which may force more registers to memory. However, the
register pressure for SDS is greater than or equal to that of MDS. The second major benefit
of MDS over SDS is that MDS imposes fewer restrictions on program input than SDS does,
as discussed in Section 4.4. The third advantage of MDS is that it has the potential to
induce less overhead than SDS does because of its reduced memory footprint and reduction
in the number of additional loads and stores that are required under its transformations, as
seen in the following section.
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Table 4.3: MDS transformation – added behavior
Description Original Behavior Added Behavior
heap
deallocation
free(p) free(pr)
store *p ← x
type(x) 6= τ∗ *pr ← x
type(x) = τ∗ *pr ← xr
load x ← *p
type(x) 6= τ∗ assert(x == *pr)
type(x) = τ∗ xr ← *pr
address of a
x ← &(p->fi) xr ← &(pr->fi)struct field
address of an
x ← &p[i] xr ← &pr[i]array element
address of a
p ← &fun pr ← &funfunction
4.2 Code Transformations for Mirrored Data Structures
As with SDS, the code transformations for MDS make use of the γ() function for transforming
function declaration arguments and function parameters. The transformations also make use
of the pi() function for translating a function’s return type into an argument set. However,
the definitions for γ() and pi() have been slightly modified. The new definitions are found
in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. γ() no longer refers to a register holding an NSOP, while rvSop
has been renamed to rvRopPtr, in pi(). The change to pi() is made to reflect the fact that
additional augmented function arguments corresponding to pointer return values are pointers
to ROPs rather than pointers to shadow objects.
γ(r) ≡


{r, rr} if type(r) = τ∗
{r} else
(4.1)
pi(t) ≡


{rvRopPtr} if t = τ∗
∅ else
(4.2)
The code transformations for MDS are specified in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The transformations
in the first table add to the original program behavior, while the transformations in the
second table replace the original program behavior. Explanations of the transformations are
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Table 4.4: MDS transformation – transformed behavior
Description Original Behavior Transformed Behavior
allocation
p ← allocate(τ) : allocate = { p ← allocate(at(τ))
malloc|alloca|global} pr ← allocate(at(τ))
pointer-to-
q ← (τ∗)p
q ← (at(τ)∗)p
pointer cast qr ← (at(τ)∗)pr
function
declaration
fun(pi(r) ∪ (
n⋃
i=
γ(ai))) :fun(a, . . . , an) :
type(fun) = r(τ, . . . , τn)
type(fun) = at(r(τ, . . . , τn))
function call
x ← fun(p, . . . , pn) :
type(fun) = r(. . .)
r = τ∗
rvRopPtr ← alloca(at(r))
x ← fun({rvRopPtr} ∪ (
n⋃
i=
γ(pi)))
xr ← *rvRopPtr
r 6= τ∗ x ← fun(
n⋃
i=
γ(pi))
function
return
return x
type(x)
= τ∗
*rvRopPtr ← xr
return x
type(x)
6= τ∗
return x
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as follows:
• allocation: When an allocation instruction occurs in the program under transforma-
tion, it is transformed to allocate an augmented type. In addition, a replica buffer of
memory is allocated.
• heap deallocation: When heap memory is deallocated, MDS inserts an instruction to
deallocate the corresponding replica memory.
• store: If a non-pointer is stored to memory by the original application, then the same
non-pointer value is stored to replica memory. On the other hand, if a pointer is stored
to application memory, then the corresponding ROP is stored to replica memory. That
is a key difference between SDS and MDS.
• load : If a non-pointer value is loaded by the original application, then, depending
on the state comparison policy, the corresponding value can be loaded from replica
memory and compared with the original loaded value. If a pointer is loaded from
memory, then the corresponding ROP is loaded from replica memory. In the case of a
loaded pointer, a load comparison never occurs, because the pointers are different by
definition.
• address of a structure field : When a program computes the address of a field in a
structure, MDS applies identical addressing arithmetic to the corresponding ROP.
• address of an array element : Likewise, if a program addresses an array element, then
identical addressing arithmetic is applied to the corresponding ROP.
• pointer-to-pointer cast : If a cast instruction from one pointer type to another pointer
type occurs, it is transformed into a cast to an augmented pointer type. A similar cast
to an augmented pointer type is applied to the corresponding ROP.
• address of a function: When a pointer is assigned the address of a function, an ROP is
assigned the same address. Since functions are never explicitly dereferenced, i.e., they
are only dereferenced via function calls, there are no corresponding replica functions
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from which to compute addresses. Thus, we simply use the same address as the
application pointer.
• function declaration: Function declarations are transformed to use augmented function
types, which potentially adds new arguments.
• function call : Function calls are transformed so that ROPs are passed to the function
for every original pointer parameter. In addition, if the called function returns a
pointer, then memory must be allocated to hold an ROP corresponding to the return
value. A pointer to that memory is passed along to the called function. When the
called function returns, the ROP corresponding to the return value is loaded from
memory.
• function return: If a function returns a pointer, then a store instruction must be
inserted before the function’s return instructions. The store writes an ROP to the
memory pointed to by the rvRopPtr argument.
• global variable initialization: As discussed in Section 2.4, global variable initialization
can be thought of as a series of non-pointer operations, pointer arithmetic, and store
operations that can be executed at compile time. Those operations can be transformed
using the rules discussed above.
We now revisit the two code transformation examples presented in Section 2.4, to see how
they look under MDS. The first example is shown in Figure 4.1. Line 5 in the transformed
code allocates replica memory on the heap that corresponds to the memory allocated by
the original program. Line 9 is inserted into the transformed code to store to the replica
memory the same non-pointer value that is stored to application memory. In contrast to
the store of a non-pointer, line 19 demonstrates that when the original code stores a pointer
to memory, MDS does not store the same pointer to replica memory. Instead, it stores an
ROP. Finally, since createNode() returns the pointer n, the corresponding pointer n r is
stored to the memory pointed to by rvRopPtr.
Figure 4.2 illustrates another code transformation. The transformation of getSum() is
presented to show load transformations. In particular, line 7 demonstrates that when the
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1 typedef struct LinkedList LL;
2 LL* createNode(int32 data, LL* last){
3
4 LL* n = malloc(LL);
5
6 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
7
8 *dataPtr = data;
9
10 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
11
12 *nxtPtr = NULL;
13
14 if(last){
15 LL* lastNxtPtr = &(last->nxt);
16
17
18 *lastNxtPtr = n;
19
20 }
21 return n;
22
23 }
(a) Original code
1 typedef struct LinkedList LL;
2 LL* createNode(LL** rvRopPtr,
3 int32 data, LL* last, LL* last_r){
4 LL* n = malloc(LL);
5 LL* n_r = malloc(LL);
6 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
7 int32* dataPtr_r = &(n_r->data);
8 *dataPtr = data;
9 *dataPtr_r = data;
10 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
11 LL* nxtPtr_r = &(n_r->nxt);
12 *nxtPtr = NULL;
13 *nxtPtr_r = NULL;
14 if(last){
15 LL* lastNxtPtr = &(last->nxt);
16 LL* lastNxtPtr_r =
17 &(last_r->nxt);
18 *lastNxtPtr = n;
19 *lastNxtPtr_r = n_r;
20 }
21 *rvRopPtr = n_r;
22 return n;
23 }
(b) Transformed code
Figure 4.1: MDS transformation of createNode()
1 int32 getSum(LL* n){
2 int32 sum = 0;
3 while(n){
4 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
5
6 int32 v = *dataPtr;
7
8 sum += v;
9 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
10
11 n = *nxtPtr;
12
13 }
14 return sum;
15 }
(a) Original code
1 int32 getSum(LL* n, LL* n_r){
2 int32 sum = 0;
3 while(n){
4 int32* dataPtr = &(n->data);
5 int32* dataPtr_r = &(n_r->data);
6 int32 v = *dataPtr;
7 assert(v == *dataPtr_r);
8 sum += v;
9 LL* nxtPtr = &(n->nxt);
10 LL* nxtPtr_r = &(n_r->nxt);
11 n = *nxtPtr;
12 n_r = *nxtPtr_r;
13 }
14 return sum;
15 }
(b) Transformed code
Figure 4.2: MDS transformation of getSum()
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original application loads a non-pointer value, DPMR can insert a load check that loads
replica memory and compares it to the value loaded from application memory. On the other
hand, if a pointer is loaded from memory, no load check is inserted, and replica memory
must be loaded, as shown in line 10. The value loaded from replica memory is the ROP for
the pointer loaded from application memory.
4.3 External Code under Mirrored Data Structures
Under MDS, we still use external function wrappers and generate and initialize replica
memory corresponding to external global variables. However, the responsibilities of external
function wrappers are slightly different from their responsibilities under SDS. The modified
responsibilities are described below.
1. External function wrappers must perform the functionalities that their correspond-
ing external functions would perform. They typically do so by calling the external
functions.
2. External function wrappers are required to allocate replica memory corresponding to
application-visible heap memory allocated by the external function.
3. Any non-pointer value stored by the external function to application-visible memory
should also be stored to corresponding replica memory. If an external function stores
a pointer to application-visible memory, the corresponding ROP should be stored to
replica memory.
4. If the external function returns a pointer, a corresponding ROP should be stored to
the memory pointed to by the wrapper’s rvRopPtr argument.
5. For any application-visible heap memory that is deallocated by the external function,
corresponding replica heap memory should be deallocated.
6. If application-visible non-pointer memory is loaded by the external function, then the
wrapper should load and compare corresponding replica memory.
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Not having to deal with shadow memory in external function wrappers helps to simplify
the implementations of several wrappers. That is particularly true for the libc functions
qsort(), memcpy(), and memmove(). In Section 3.1.5 we discussed how those functions
require an extra parameter specifying information about the shadow types of the memory
they manipulate. The extra parameter was necessary because those functions dealt with
memory using generic types. Under MDS, that is no longer a problem. Replica memory has
the same layout as application memory within an allocated buffer. Therefore, generic type
operations can be applied in the same way to both. However, if one wishes to perform load
comparisons in the wrappers for memcpy() and memmove(), an extra parameter would still
be required to indicate what is a pointer and what is not. That need not be the case with
qsort(), because qsort() requires a comparison function that compares the memory to be
sorted, and the load comparisons can be left to that comparison function.
4.4 Limitations of Mirrored Data Structures
Below, we consider the restrictions that MDS imposes on an input program.
• store: Like SDS, MDS requires that pointers be typed as pointers when they are stored
to memory. It does not matter if the pointers are typed accurately or precisely.
• load : As with stores, loads of pointers must be typed as pointers. SDS has the same
requirement. Again, it does not matter if the pointers are typed accurately or precisely.
• int-to-pointer casts : Int-to-pointer casts are not allowed because DPMR would have
no way to set corresponding ROPs. SDS also forbids int-to-pointer casts.
• external code: External code support libraries must be implemented for all external
code with which an input program interacts. The same restriction applies to SDS.
The above list is much shorter than the list of limitations for SDS because MDS eliminates
the need for several of the restrictions that SDS required. The following is a discussion of
the limitations that were eliminated.
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• memory allocation: Unlike SDS, MDS does not impose any restrictions on memory
allocations. SDS had restrictions on the compile time allocation type so that enough
shadow memory would be allocated, which is no longer an issue.
• store: It is no longer necessary to type non-pointers as non-pointers at store sites.
• load : It is no longer necessary to type non-pointers as non-pointers at load sites.
• structure and array pointer arithmetic: There are no type restrictions for pointer
arithmetic. That is one of the biggest advantages of MDS over SDS. Restrictions on
pointer arithmetic were required under SDS so that we would be able to address shadow
memory appropriately. Without shadow memory, restrictions on pointer arithmetic
are no longer required, because any type-generic pointer arithmetic that is applied to
application memory can be applied to replica memory. That is the case because the
layouts of data in application and replica objects are structurally identical.
• pointer-to-pointer casts : There are no restrictions on pointer-to-pointer casts. SDS
had restrictions on pointer-to-pointer casts so that we could handle NSOPs correctly.
It is also worth noting that the limitations of MDS can be reasoned about using a pointer
analysis, while it is necessary to have type information as well in order to reason about the
limitations of SDS.
4.5 Mirrored Data Structures Results
We turn our attention to experimental results. The MDS experiments evaluated the same
diversity transformations and state comparison polices that we previously evaluated under
SDS. When examining state comparison policies, the following must be kept in mind. Con-
sider static load-checking. Let P be the number of loads of pointers in a program, and let
N be the number of non-pointer loads. If we only include β of the load checks, then under
SDS we will have removed (1− β)(P +N) load checks. However, under MDS we will have
removed only (1− β)N load checks. In terms of reduction of overhead, we therefore expect
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Figure 4.3: Side-by-side diversity transformation overheads of SDS and MDS
that a switch from the SDS all loads policy to the SDS static load-checking β comparison
policy will result in greater improvement than could be obtained by switching from the
MDS all loads policy to the MDS static load-checking β policy. A similar argument holds
for temporal load-checking.
Since reduced overhead is one of the potential benefits of MDS, we examine it next.
Figure 4.3 shows a side-by-side comparison of diversity transformations under SDS and
MDS. As in other evaluations of diversity transformations, results are evaluated with the all
loads state comparison policy. In all cases except one (art pad-malloc 32), MDS outperforms
its SDS counterpart, albeit marginally so for art and bzip2. Examination of the code for
the four benchmarks indicates that the fractions of the allocations that are for memory to
hold pointers are larger for equake and mcf than for art and bzip2. That observation fits the
overhead results. If very few pointers are stored to memory, then the executions of SDS and
MDS are very similar. Without pointers in memory, SDS does not need to allocate shadow
memory, and everything in memory will be comparable for MDS. Therefore, the memory
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Figure 4.4: Side-by-side comparison policy overheads of SDS and MDS
overhead of SDS and MDS will be the same, and they both will perform comparisons at
every load. For the more pointer-heavy benchmarks, equake and mcf, MDS is able to achieve
stronger overhead gains. The MDS diversity transformation overheads for equake are 74%
to 89% of their SDS counterparts, and the MDS mcf overheads are 81% to 84% of the SDS
overheads.
We now compare overhead results for state comparison policies, using the rearrange-heap
diversity transformation. Those results can be seen in Figure 4.4. In the side-by-side com-
parison, we do not include temporal load-checking results, since they are generally worse
than the all loads results. Full overhead results for MDS can be seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
In Figure 4.4, the pointer-heavy benchmarks, equake and mcf, tend to see performance gains
from MDS. For bzip2, the overheads under MDS tend to be about the same as those under
SDS. For art, SDS tends to outperform MDS; however, we attribute that to caching effects
and the random nature of the load-checking selection process under static load-checking.
In order not to marginalize its benefits, MDS must be capable of achieving reasonable
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Figure 4.5: MDS overhead of diversity transformations
dependability. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show mean coverage results of diversity transformations
for heap array resizes and immediate frees, respectively, while Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show mean
conditional coverage. The coverage results are shown on a per-application basis, and the
conditional coverage results are combined across all applications. As with SDS, all heap array
resizes are covered with implicit diversity, i.e., the no-diversity policy. On the other hand,
the rearrange-heap policy is the only policy to detect all immediate frees. We conjectured
in Section 3.7 that the randomness of the rearrange-heap transformation improves dangling
pointer detection by decreasing the likelihood that an application object-replica pair occupies
the same memory as a previous application object-replica pair.
The last metric we examine is detection latency. Results for diversity transformations
are displayed in Table 4.5. When compared to the SDS detection latencies from Table 3.3,
the results are very similar. Rearrange-heap tends to have similar detection latencies to
other policies for bzip2, equake, and mcf; however, rearrange-heap has much lower detection
latencies for art.
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Figure 4.6: MDS overhead of state comparison policies
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Figure 4.7: Mean MDS heap array resize coverage of diversity transformations
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Figure 4.8: Mean MDS immediate free coverage of diversity transformations
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Figure 4.9: Mean MDS heap array resize conditional coverage of diversity transformations
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Figure 4.10: Mean MDS immediate free conditional coverage of diversity transformations
Table 4.5: Mean time to detection of diversity transformations under MDS
variant
msecs
art bzip2 equake mcf
no-diversity 5380.62 262.42 175.27 4.13
h
ea
p
ar
ra
y
re
si
ze
s
zero-before-free 5501.68 254.51 168.18 4.10
rearrange-heap 53.48 123.81 175.28 4.16
pad-malloc 8 5662.55 259.95 176.06 4.11
pad-malloc 32 5795.81 255.93 199.22 4.16
pad-malloc 256 138.27 256.14 359.25 4.22
pad-malloc 1024 178.92 254.13 827.85 4.10
no-diversity 8019.51 4346.01 140.84 6.37
im
m
ed
ia
te
fr
ee
s
zero-before-free 7891.38 4273.82 138.36 92.24
rearrange-heap 21.79 4722.31 273.40 4.25
pad-malloc 8 8083.59 4318.01 163.51 5.70
pad-malloc 32 7369.63 4322.33 183.66 6.66
pad-malloc 256 7764.75 4290.65 333.04 5.66
pad-malloc 1024 50.62 4346.71 804.23 7.57
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Figure 4.11: Mean MDS heap array resize coverage of state comparison policies
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 plot the mean coverage of state comparison policies under the
rearrange-heap diversity mechanism, and Figures 4.13 and 4.14 plot mean conditional cov-
erage. As was the case earlier, coverage results are shown on a per-application basis, and
conditional coverage results are combined across all applications. The results are similar
to those for SDS. Coverage remains robust in the face of reduced checking. In the MDS
results, temporal load-checking looks to be more robust than static load-checking. That is
most likely due to the nature of static load-checking. A reduction of 50% of the load checks
at compile time could end up removing nearly all or almost none of the load checks during
runtime. The drop in coverage of the 10% and 50% static load-checking policies could also
be an indication that certain faults end up impacting only certain load sites. Under tempo-
ral load-checking, each load will most likely get checked at some point, while under static
load-checking, if a load check is removed, then that load site will never be checked.
MDS detection latency is captured in Table 4.6, for state comparison policies. MDS
detection latency exhibits similar behavior to SDS detection latency. Static load-checking
tends to have similar or lower detection latencies than the all loads policy does, and temporal
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Figure 4.12: Mean MDS immediate free coverage of state comparison policies
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Figure 4.13: Mean MDS heap array resize conditional coverage of state comparison policies
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Figure 4.14: Mean MDS immediate free conditional coverage of state comparison policies
Table 4.6: Mean time to detection of state comparison policies under MDS
variant
msecs
art bzip2 equake mcf
all loads 53.48 123.81 175.28 4.16
h
ea
p
ar
ra
y
re
si
ze
s
temporal 1/8 96.88 270.04 182.76 4.01
temporal 1/2 50.58 267.70 172.57 3.96
temporal 7/8 48.64 288.11 173.50 4.15
static 10% 42.60 183.41 196.48 4.11
static 50% 38.24 108.71 202.00 4.00
static 90% 45.78 103.58 176.88 4.20
all loads 21.79 4722.31 273.40 4.25
im
m
ed
ia
te
fr
ee
s
temporal 1/8 84.59 7181.54 286.83 2.89
temporal 1/2 31.00 7737.00 284.68 2.95
temporal 7/8 31.14 8592.45 290.79 2.97
static 10% 11.97 2997.18 211.01 5.03
static 50% 11.93 4041.11 254.92 3.98
static 90% 21.34 3698.74 269.41 5.75
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load-checking tends to have higher detection latencies.
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Chapter 5
Scope Expansion Through Static Analysis
In this chapter, we aim to eliminate most of the restrictions on input programs under
the MDS-based DPMR approach. We do so by reasoning about program memory using
a context-sensitive, field-sensitive points-to analysis called Data Structure Analysis [63].
Section 5.1 describes the features of Data Structure Analysis that are most important for
DPMR. In Section 5.2 we examine the restrictions imposed by MDS and why they exist. In
Section 5.3 we propose algorithms, based on Data Structure Analysis, that eliminate most
of those restrictions. In Section 5.4 we examine how external code support libraries can ex-
ist alongside those algorithms. Section 5.5 discusses behavior that Data Structure Analysis
considers unknown. Finally, Section 5.6 considers issues that remain.
5.1 Data Structure Analysis
Data Structure Analysis (DSA) is a context-sensitive, field-sensitive pointer/memory anal-
ysis. Context sensitivity is achieved by distinguishing heap objects by (acyclic) call paths,
rather than by allocation sites. DSA also maintains field sensitivity when memory is used in
a type-homogeneous manner, which is of particular importance for DPMR. Field sensitivity
allows DPMR to distinguish between pointers and non-pointers in memory. The version of
Data Structure Analysis that we use is based on the latest developed version and contains
some features not present in the version detailed in [63]. However, all of the features we use
are described here.
DSA produces a per-function DS graph that can be queried to determine properties about
memory pointed to by virtual registers in the associated function. A DS graph is a directed
graph defined for a function F by the tuple (N, V,Ncall, E, EV ), where N , V , and Ncall are
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sets of nodes in the graph, and E and EV are sets of edges in the graph.
1 N is a set of nodes
called DS nodes , each of which represents some set of memory objects that are visible to F .
As discussed below, DS nodes are composed of a set of data fields, among other things. V
is the set of virtual registers in the scope of F , including registers for F ’s arguments, F ’s
return value, and global variables. As stated at the beginning of Chapter 2, global variables
are treated as pointers to memory. Ncall is a set of call nodes that represent call sites in F .
Like DS nodes, call nodes are composed of a set of fields, the meaning of which is discussed
below. E is a set of edges, each of which maps either a DS node-field pair 〈ns1, fs1〉 or a call
node-field pair 〈ns2, fs2〉 to a DS node-field pair 〈nd, fd〉, such that ns1, nd ∈ N , ns2 ∈ Ncall,
fs1 ∈ fields(ns1), fs2 ∈ fields(ns2), and fd ∈ fields(nd). Edges in E are constrained such
that at most one edge e ∈ E may have 〈n, f〉 as a source, for a given n ∈ (N ∪ Ncall)
and f ∈ fields(n). Finally, EV is a set of edges mapping a virtual register v ∈ V to a DS
node-field pair 〈n, f〉.
We now discuss the components of DS nodes. DS nodes are composed of four components.
One component is a list of types that the memory represented by a node may take. Another
component is a list of global objects represented by the node. Functions are global objects,
so a DS node may represent a function. The third component is a set of fields. The fields
represent a partitioning of the corresponding memory object into different data types. Field
sensitivity is maintained only if the object is used in a type-homogeneous manner. If a field
is used as a pointer, i.e., it is used to perform a load, store, or indexing operation, then the
field will have an outgoing edge that is an element of E. The last component of a DS node
is a set of flags, each of which we describe below.
• complete and incomplete flags (C, I): Complete nodes are nodes for which all informa-
tion has been processed. Complete nodes may not alias with any other nodes (with the
exception of unknown nodes, which we discuss later). Once a node has been marked
complete, its properties will never change, and it will never be merged with another
node. On the other hand, incomplete nodes represent objects for which we have partial
information. Information may be partial because pointers to the DS node escape to
1Note that the DS graph definition given here is slightly different from that given in [63].
103
1 int32* x = (int32*)malloc([3xint32]);
2 int64 y = (int64)x;
3 y = y+4;
4 int32* z = (int32*)y;
5
(a) Pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer casts
1 int32** x = malloc(int32*);
2 int32* y = (int32*)malloc([2xint32]);
3 *x = y;
4 int64* xc = (int64*)x;
5 int64 yval = *xc;
(b) Layered pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer casts
Figure 5.1: Examples of pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer behavior
external functions. The properties of an incomplete node may change in the future,
and the node may be merged with other nodes. Conservatively, we must assume that
any two incomplete nodes can alias.
• memory segment flags (H, S, G): DS nodes are marked with H, S, and G flags indi-
cating that the memory represented by the node may reside on the heap, in the stack,
or in global variables, respectively. One DS node may possess multiple memory seg-
ment flags, indicating that the memory it represents may reside in any of the flagged
segments.
• array flag (A): The array flag indicates that the memory represented by a DS node
includes one or more array objects. If a DS node has fields f0 to fn and is marked as
an array, then it is assumed that each element in the array has fields f0 through fn.
• collapsed flag (O): If the fields of a DS node are used in a non-type-homogeneous way,
then the fields of the node are collapsed into a single field, and the collapsed flag is
set. When the fields are collapsed, the outgoing edges of those fields are collapsed into
a single edge through merging of the nodes to which those pointers point. Finally, the
node is marked with the array flag, and its type is set to a byte array.
• pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer flags (P, 2): The latest version of DSA uses pointer-
to-int and int-to-pointer flags. There are two types of pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer
behavior that DSA captures. The first type is standard pointer-to-int and int-to-
pointer casts as illustrated in lines 2 and 4 of Figure 5.1(a), respectively. The code in
Figure 5.1(a) causes the DS node to which x points to be marked with a pointer-to-int
flag. Meanwhile, the node to which z points is marked with an int-to-pointer flag.
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object X
Figure 5.2: Reachable object
Note that in the example in Figure 5.1(a), x and z point to the same DS node. The
second type of behavior that DSA captures is layered pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer
casts, i.e., casts that are buried under at least one pointer. Line 4 of Figure 5.1(b)
contains a layered pointer-to-int cast. In line 5, the pointer that x points to is loaded as
an integer. At that point, DSA marks the memory to which x points as pointer-to-int
and int-to-pointer.
• unknown flag (U): The unknown flag is used for nodes whose allocation source is
unrecognized. Since DSA does not track pointers through integers, nodes marked
int-to-pointer are also marked as unknown. Conservatively, it must be assumed that
unknown nodes can alias with any other node, including complete nodes.
Call nodes are composed of a set of fields, just like DS nodes; however, the other DS node
components do not apply to call nodes. The fields of a call node represent the return value
for, the called function pointer for, and parameter values passed to the call site represented
by the call node. If the call site’s return value or a parameter of the call site is used as
a pointer, then the corresponding field in the call node will have an outgoing edge that is
a member of E. A call node’s function pointer field points to a DS node representing the
function (or collection of functions) that may be called by the corresponding call site.
DS graphs are constructed using a three-phase process. The first phase, the local phase,
constructs a DS graph for each function in the input program. The graph that is constructed
for a function F considers only F ’s instructions. All DS nodes in F ’s DS graph are initially
marked incomplete. During the local phase, those nodes will be marked complete only if the
memory they represent is not reachable via potential callers of F and potential callees of
F . The reachability property includes reachability through pointers stored in memory. For
example, in Figure 5.2, if p is passed to a function G via a function call, then object X is
reachable from G.
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The second phase is the bottom-up phase. During the bottom-up phase, information from
callees is propagated to callers. That is done by cloning of the graphs of callees into callers.
After the bottom-up phase, some incomplete nodes in a DS graph may be marked complete.
In particular, if an incomplete node in function F ’s DS graph is not reachable by callers of
F , or external callees, then the node is marked complete. The final phase is the top-down
phase. The top-down phase propagates analysis from callers to callees by merging the graphs
of callers into callees. Upon completion of the top-down phase, the nodes in function F ’s
DS graph will be marked complete unless they are reachable by unresolved external callers
or callees.
5.2 Behavior Forbidden by Mirrored Data Structures
Section 4.4 lists the restrictions imposed by MDS on input programs. In this section, we
discuss in detail the problems that lead to those restrictions so that we can handle them
using DSA.
• load comparison problem: When DPMR loads a value from memory, it needs to be
able to determine if the value is a pointer value. If the value could be a pointer value,
then we need to omit any comparisons, or the result could be a false positive.
• int-to-pointer casts : MDS cannot tolerate int-to-pointer casts, because such casts
would prevent it from computing an appropriate ROP.
• stores of pointers masquerading as integers : When a pointer masquerading as an inte-
ger is stored to memory, MDS stores an application pointer to both application memory
and replica memory, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. That can lead to two problems. First,
it can lead to a memory leak. If the only pointer to an object is stored to memory
as an integer and then goes out of scope, we will lose the only pointer to its replica.
The second problem that can occur is the omission of a replica update. Consider the
memory layout in Figure 5.4. Storing a pointer to X in A that is masquerading as an
integer, causes the same pointer to be stored to Ar. If the pointer stored to A is later
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memory
application
replica
memory
Ar Xr
XA
Figure 5.3: Result of storing a pointer masquerading as an integer
memory
replica
Ar Br Xr
XBA
memory
application
Figure 5.4: Situation that could lead to an update omission
used to update X, X will be updated, but Xr will not be updated. If the pointers to
X and Xr stored in B and Br, respectively, are used to read X and Xr, we will detect
a discrepancy between the values of X and Xr.
• pointer-to-int casts and loads of pointers masquerading as integers : Pointer-to-int casts
are not a problem; neither are loads of pointers masquerading as integers, as long as
such loads are not involved in a load comparison. However, pointer-to-int casts and
loads of pointers masquerading as integers often lead to int-to-pointer casts and stores
of pointers masquerading as integers, which are problems, as we have discussed.
• loads and stores of integers masquerading as pointers : We wish to point out that loads
and stores of integers masquerading as pointers are not actually problems, however
bizarre such behavior may seem.
• external code: In the MDS design discussed in Chapter 4, external code is a problem,
because it can lead to the omission of DPMR behavior, such as replica allocation,
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deallocation, and updates.
5.3 Eliminating Limitations
Using DSA, we can eliminate most restrictions on input programs. Before presenting the
techniques for doing so, we stipulate that after DSA analyzes an input program, any DS nodes
that are marked as unknown must have been caused by int-to-pointer behavior whose source
is pointer-to-int behavior. Such a stipulation is more than reasonable for most applications.
Some exceptions do exist, such as device drivers, which may require writes to a particular
range of memory addresses. However, Section 5.5 discusses methods for getting around the
new stipulation. It should be noted that the stipulation is a subset of the restrictions given
in Section 5.2.
The technique for handling int-to-pointer casts and stores of pointers masquerading as
integers is discussed first. The approach we take is to eliminate the allocation of replica
memory corresponding to an application object O, whose references could be involved in an
int-to-pointer cast or stored as pointers masquerading as integers. At such allocation sites,
the corresponding ROP is set to point to O, the allocated application object. In addition,
at int-to-pointer casts, the corresponding ROP receives the same value as the resulting
application pointer. The result is that an ROP corresponding to a pointer that points to O
will also point to O. Such a procedure renders some load comparisons ineffective, but it is
safe, as those load comparisons will never falsely detect errors.
When stores of pointers masquerading as integers occur, we store to replica memory
the same integer value that is stored to application memory, which is the precise behavior
we desire, given the above modification to our allocation strategy. Furthermore, the two
problems that result from stores of pointers masquerading as integers, as discussed in the
previous section, are no longer issues. A replica memory leak and an omitted replica update
can no longer occur because there is no replica.
The technique just discussed causes us to require two additional changes. First, we must
eliminate replica allocations for application memory that is reachable from unreplicated
memory. We must do so because unreplicated memory does not provide a place to store ROPs
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2, P
Figure 5.5: DS graph for F1
for objects directly reachable from the unreplicated memory. Second, at heap deallocation
sites that may involve unreplicated memory, we must insert a check into the transformed
program that eliminates the deallocation of replica objects if the pointers to them are equal
to the corresponding application pointers.
When determining if an allocation site should be replicated, we eliminate an allocation site
p← allocate(τ) from consideration if the DS node to which p points is marked pointer-to-int,
int-to-pointer, or incomplete. Allocation sites pointing to DS nodes marked pointer-to-int
or int-to-pointer are not replicated because pointers to those nodes may have been stored as
integers. In addition, nodes marked int-to-pointer include nodes whose pointers may have
been involved in int-to-pointer cast instructions. Allocation sites pointing to incomplete
nodes should not be replicated because we do not have enough information to know if they
should be marked with pointer-to-int or int-to-pointer flags.
Those conditions may seem sufficient for determining if an allocation site should be repli-
cated. However, they are not. As stated earlier, we need to eliminate the replication of
memory that is reachable from other unreplicated memory. While it is true that a node
reachable from an incomplete node will be incomplete, that type of reachability property
does not extend to pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer flags. For example, if a node is marked
int-to-pointer, that does not imply that the nodes it can reach will be marked int-to-pointer.
Furthermore, DS graphs are insufficient to determine that reachability. Consider the DS
graph in Figure 5.5, for a function F1. N1 is marked pointer-to-int and int-to-pointer, and
one of its fields points to N2. In addition, one of N2’s fields points to N3. Imagine the
case where q is passed to a callee F2. When F1’s DS graph is cloned into F2’s DS graph,
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N2 N3
Figure 5.6: DS graph for F2
Input G = (N,V,Ncall, E,EV ): DS graph
markX(G)
1: WorkingSet← ∅
2: ProcessedSet← ∅
3: ∀n ∈ N
4: if(P ∈ flags(n) ∨ 2 ∈ flags(n) ∨X ∈ flags(n))
5: WorkingSet←WorkingSet ∪ {n}
6: while(∃n ∈WorkingSet)
7: WorkingSet←WorkingSet− {n}
8: ProcessedSet← ProcessedSet ∪ {n}
9: flags(n)← flags(n) ∪ {X}
10: ∀f ∈ fields(n)
11: if(E(〈n, f〉) = 〈m, g〉 : m ∈ N, g ∈ fields(m))
12: if(m 6∈WorkingSet ∧m 6∈ ProcessedSet)
13: WorkingSet ∪WorkingSet{m}
Figure 5.7: Algorithm for markX()
N1 will not be included because it is not reachable from F2, as illustrated in Figure 5.6.
Now, imagine that an allocation instruction A in F2 can allocate N3. When we examine
the DS node to which A points, i.e., N3, F2’s graph will not be enough to tell us that a
node marked pointer-to-int or int-to-pointer could point to N3.
One solution to the above problem is to add a new flag X to DSA. If a node is marked
with X, then it is reachable by a pointer-to-int or int-to-pointer node. It is possible to
propagate X by applying the algorithm in Figure 5.7 to each DS graph after each phase of
DSA. The algorithm starts by building a working set of all nodes that have pointer-to-int,
int-to-pointer, or X flags. For each node in the working set, we add the X flag to it. We also
add the node’s children to the working set, if they are not already in the working set and
have not already been processed. The result allows us to declare, at the conclusion of DSA,
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that a node should not be replicated if it has either the I or X flag.
We now tackle the load comparison problem. Given our new constraints on replicating
memory, the load comparison problem becomes very simple. All we need to do is check if
the loaded value has ever been used as a pointer. For a load x ← ∗p, if p points to 〈n, f〉,
such that n ∈ N and f ∈ flags(n), then we should omit a comparison if E(〈n, f〉) 6= ∅. If
E(〈n, f〉) 6= ∅, then x has been used as a pointer. If E(〈n, f〉) = ∅, it is still possible that
x is a pointer. That case can arise only if n has incomplete, int-to-pointer, or pointer-to-int
behavior. However, if n has incomplete, int-to-pointer, or pointer-to-int behavior, then it
will not be replicated, in which case we will be comparing a pointer to itself, which is safe.
An additional benefit of the proposed approach is that it allows us to process input pro-
grams that use external code for which DPMR does not have support. Any memory that
originates in unsupported external code or is passed to unsupported external code is not
replicated. At first, it might seem that we would not be able to detect errors in such un-
replicated memory. However, that is not necessarily the case. Our detection mechanism
is not based solely on examining memory from which an error originated. It is also based
on examining replicated memory in which one member is corrupted by an error that origi-
nated elsewhere. Our results using static load-checking suggested that it is not necessarily
a requirement that we perform load checks on the memory from which an error originated,
lending further credibility to the techniques proposed in this chapter.
5.4 Using Data Structure Analysis with External Code Support
Libraries
The techniques suggested in this chapter lead to the question of whether we can still use
external code support libraries to try to strengthen dependability. The answer is yes. In
order to use an external function wrapper for an external function F , we require that F be
modeled in DSA. Since external function wrappers emulate the DPMR behavior that would
be applied to an external function if it were not external, we need the external function
to be modeled by DSA so that we can make decisions on what memory to replicate and
which loads to check. The current DSA implementation has behavior modeled for most
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libc functions.
A wrapper for F that is used at a call site C must now meet the following necessary
conditions. (1) If F allocates memory, and at the call site C, according to our algorithms,
that memory should not be replicated, then the wrapper must not replicate it. (2) If F loads
a value from memory that should not be compared to a replica, then the wrapper must not
perform the load comparison. (3) If F deallocates memory that might not be replicated,
according to our algorithms, then an ROP for that memory must not be deallocated if
it equals the corresponding application pointer, at runtime. That leads to the existence
of multiple wrappers for F , all with different replication and load comparison behaviors.
Fortunately, there is a default safe wrapper behavior that can be used if one does not wish
to generate wrappers for all possible replication and load-checking behaviors, of which there
could be an arbitrarily large number for a function like memcpy(). The default safe behavior
is never to replicate allocations, never to perform load comparisons, and to check that ROPs
do not equal their corresponding application pointers before deallocating them.
5.5 Unknown DSA Behavior
As discussed in the previous section, we have one remaining restriction. Specifically, we
require that unknown nodes in DSA must result from int-to-pointer behavior whose source
is pointer-to-int behavior. Thus, programs are forbidden to hard-code addresses, instead of
going through the standard channels of malloc, alloca, and global variables.2 If a program
violates our restriction, one of three things can occur. (1) If unknown behavior results in a
pointer to memory M that does not alias with the memory allocated by malloc, alloca,
and global variables, then everything will work fine. M will be like any other unreplicated
memory, and pointers resulting from int-to-pointer instructions will result in ROPs with the
same pointer value, as they should. Therefore, device driver code that requires hard-coded
addresses to memory that is not allocated through standard channels will operate correctly
2Other standard channels of memory allocation exist, such as mmap() and application-specific allocators.
Such allocation channels are not handled by the current implementation of DPMR; however, they will work
with the algorithms proposed in this chapter.
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under DPMR. (2) If unknown behavior results in pointers to unreplicated memory allocated
by malloc, alloca, or global variables, then a similar scenario will result. (3) Finally, if
unknown behavior results in pointers to replicated memory, omitted replica updates, memory
leaks, and false positives in DPMR detection could occur.
If a program wishes to replicate memory that must reside at hard-coded addresses and
is not allocated using malloc, alloca, or global variables, the easiest solution is to include
an external function in the input program that produces the address. Then a wrapper can
be written for the external function that allocates replica memory, most likely on the heap.
The model of the external function that would be used by DSA would treat the function as
if it allocated a block of memory on the heap.
5.6 Remaining Issues
Earlier in this chapter, we presented techniques to remove the restrictions on input pro-
grams under MDS. However, there are a few remaining issues that deserve discussion. The
first is the precision of DSA. As previously noted, a DS node represents a group of memory
objects. If a node is marked incomplete, pointer-to-int, or int-to-pointer, that does not nec-
essarily mean that every memory object represented by the node escapes to external code,
is involved in pointer-to-int behavior, or is involved in int-to-pointer behavior, respectively.
One way to distinguish the objects represented by a single DS node is to utilize function
inlining. Consider the code in Figure 5.8. Assume that pointers in the target architecture
are 64 bits in length. In addition, assume that f() and g() are the only functions that
ever call copy128(). After DSA runs, the pointers p and q, in function f(), will point to
DS nodes that are marked complete, while o1 and o2, in function g(), will point to DS
nodes that are marked incomplete. o1 and o2 are marked incomplete because they escape
to the external getObject() function. As a result, the DS nodes pointed to by s and d,
from copy128(), will be marked incomplete. In copy128(), there is no way to distinguish
between the objects coming from f() and the objects coming from g(), so their behavior is
merged in the analysis of copy128(). If copy128() were inlined into f() and g(), then we
would be able to distinguish between the two different behaviors.
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1 typedef struct{
2 int8[]* x;
3 int64 y;
4 } Object;
5
6 extern Object* getObject(void);
7
8 void copy128(void* d, void* s){
9 int64[]* a = (int64*)s;
10 int64[]* b = (int64*)d;
11 a[0] = b[0];
12 a[1] = b[1];
13 }
14
15 void f(){
16 int64[]* p = malloc([2xint64]);
17 p[0] = 1;
18 p[1] = 2;
19 int64[]* q = malloc([2xint64]);
20 copy128(q, p);
21 }
22
23 void g(){
24 Object* o1 = getObject(void);
25 o1->x = malloc([10xint8]);
26 o1->y = 10;
27 Object* o2 = getObject(void);
28 copy128(o2, o1);
29 }
Figure 5.8: Candidate for inlining
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Another issue that we have not yet addressed is concurrency. Given our assumption that
global variables are pointers to statically allocated memory, we can assume that the only
information shared between threads is shared through memory. To ensure consistency, we
must ensure that reads to application and replica memory, as well as writes, are atomic.
Memory allocations of application and replica memory need not be atomic as long as they
occur one after the other before any users of either allocation are allowed to proceed in
the corresponding thread of execution. Memory deallocation need not be atomic either,
although the reasoning is more complicated. Not requiring deallocation to be atomic could
lead to arbitrary behavior if another thread of execution accessed one object in an application
object-replica pair, when one of the objects was deallocated and one was not. However, such
behavior could only result from a race condition, which is erroneous behavior. Therefore,
the expected results are already arbitrary.
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Chapter 6
Future Possibilities
This dissertation has proposed and evaluated many ideas centered around DPMR; however,
much more research could be done. We discuss five possibilities below.
• application of DPR in other contexts : As discussed in Section 1.2, DPMR falls into
a broader category of Diverse Partial Replication techniques. In that section, we
discussed how diverse replicated execution might be used to detect race conditions.
One path of new research would be to explore the ability of DPR to detect concurrency
errors.
• using DSA with SDS : In Chapter 5, we discussed applications of DSA to remove
restrictions on the MDS-based DPMR design. DSA could be used to do the same
for the SDS-based design. One of the key differences between the restrictions of SDS
and those of MDS is that SDS requires more extensive knowledge of memory types.
Fortunately, DSA tracks memory types and discerns when memory is used in a type-
inconsistent manner. Using a strategy similar to the one discussed in Chapter 5, SDS
could use DSA to disable the replication of memory whose type is not used in the
required manner.
• selective pool replication: One goal of DPMR that could be further explored is tunabil-
ity. One approach for achieving greater tunability is to logically segregate application
memory into independent pools for which replication can be enabled and disabled. A
similar concept is applied in Chapter 5. In that chapter, we describe work in which we
segregated memory into two pools and disabled replication for one of the pools. How-
ever, that idea could be extended using concepts from the compiler transformation
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Pool Allocation [64]. In the Pool Allocation work, the heap is physically partitioned;
however, the framework is there to distinguish pools of memory logically.
• runtime tunability : Another potential direction of future work would be development
of techniques for runtime tunability. We already explored one strategy that could po-
tentially be used for runtime tunability, i.e., temporal load-checking. The frequency
of runtime checks could be tuned at runtime under temporal load-checking. Unfortu-
nately, we saw that temporal load-checking was unable to fulfill its goal of reducing
overhead. However, in Section 3.8 we discussed how the periodic nature of temporal
load-checking could be exploited to achieve a more efficient implementation. Although
such a technique requires knowledge of the checking frequency, a program, at runtime,
could switch between multiple versions of a code segment, each with a different check-
ing frequency. If selective pool replication were developed, it might also be possible to
provide tunability by allowing replication of memory pools to be enabled and disabled
at runtime.
• memory performance optimization: Clearly, if replica memory is required, there will
always be overhead associated with it. However, one method for minimizing that
overhead is to hide latencies associated with fetching memory pages that hold replica
and shadow objects. We propose two ways to do that. First, for objects that are
significantly smaller than a page size, we could force application objects, replica objects,
and shadow objects (if using SDS) to be placed on the same memory page. When doing
so, we would still need to ensure sufficient diversity for detection purposes. Second, load
checks could be transformed so that replica objects are fetched at the time application
objects are loaded, but the load checks are delayed, so that execution is not stalled
waiting for replica objects. Prefetching instructions exist in the x86 SIMD instruction
set that could be used for that purpose.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
At the beginning of this dissertation, we hypothesized that diversity and replicated runtime
execution could be utilized in an automated way to detect software memory errors in an
effective and tunable manner. The analysis throughout this dissertation justifies that hy-
pothesis. In particular, we proposed the DPMR approach, in Chapter 2, to detect spatial
and temporal memory errors in all segments of data memory. In doing so, we defined the
partial replication concept and discussed its application to memory. We also proposed a so-
lution to the problem of handling pointers stored to memory. Our solution involved the use
of shadow data structures and was chosen to maximize error detection. We then developed
compiler techniques that automatically transform an input program to use partial memory
replication. The development of those transformations was followed by the development
of transformations for diversifying memory layouts. We also designed tunable policies for
comparing the states of partial memory replicas.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the construction of a DPMR compiler for the C programming
language. That discussion involved many practical details specific to the application of
DPMR to C. That chapter also contained an extensive experimental evaluation of DPMR.
The evaluation included fault-injection experiments to evaluate the dependability properties
of DPMR, as well as non-fault-injection experiments to ascertain the overhead imposed by
DPMR. Results showed that the proposed rearrange-heap transformation detected all of
the faults we injected. When evaluating state comparison policies, we found out that the
temporal load-checking implementation was insufficient for reducing overhead, while static
load-checking was able to reduce overhead up to one-third while still achieving high coverage.
Based on static load-checking results, we conjectured that coverage was spatially robust, as
coverage did not drop until we dramatically spatially reduced the checking frequency.
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Chapter 4 proposed another memory layout as an alternative to the SDS-based layout
that was initially proposed. The alternative layout, MDS, has three advantages over SDS.
First, its memory footprint is two times the size of the original application’s, while the
memory footprint for SDS is two to four times the size of the original application’s. Second,
MDS imposes fewer restrictions on input programs than SDS does. Third, MDS has the
potential to impose less overhead than SDS. Indeed, experimental results demonstrated
modest overhead improvements for two of the applications under study.
Although the MDS approach relaxed the restrictions of SDS, it still imposed important
restrictions. Chapter 5 aimed to remove nearly all of those restrictions, including require-
ments on external code. The approach for relaxing the restrictions is to use a memory
analysis, called Data Structure Analysis, to identify the program behavior about which we
can adequately reason. We then eliminate the application of DPMR to behavior for which
we cannot adequately reason. Although that has the potential to reduce coverage, it does
not mean that we will not be able to detect software memory errors in the unreplicated
components. Our approach detects errors when they corrupt replicated memory; however,
the errors may originate in replicated or unreplicated memory.
We feel that DPMR is an important new approach to detecting software memory errors.
It showcases the power of diverse replication as an approach for detecting software errors.
Although further contributions can be made to improve tunability and reduce overhead, we
feel that this dissertation has contributed a solid framework on which to build.
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